Shari B. v. Kijakazi

Background

Shari B. sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits. She alleged disability beginning July 25, 2019, based on rheumatoid arthritis, stage 2b breast cancer, acute kidney disease, anxiety, an ascending-aorta condition, diabetes, and interstitial cystitis. At the administrative hearing, her attorney also raised a recent diagnosis of osteoporosis.

The administrative law judge found that Shari B. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date and had severe impairments consisting of inflammatory arthritis and diabetes mellitus. The administrative law judge found anxiety and breast cancer, which was in remission, to be non-severe. The administrative law judge determined that none of the impairments met or equaled a listed impairment and found that Shari B. had the residual functional capacity—the most she could still do despite her impairments—to perform less than the full range of sedentary work, with specified lifting, sitting, standing, walking, postural, handling, fingering, and hazard limitations.

The administrative law judge found that Shari B. could not perform her past work as a postal clerk but could perform other jobs identified by a vocational expert: printed circuit board taper, assembler, and printed circuit board screener. The administrative law judge concluded that these jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy and denied benefits. The Appeals Council declined further review.

Court’s Analysis

The court reviewed whether the administrative law judge’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, meaning relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate. The court upheld the administrative law judge’s findings concerning Shari B.’s ability to reach, handle, and finger. It concluded that the administrative law judge considered the medical records, Shari B.’s testimony and daily activities, and the treating rheumatologist’s opinion, and that the court could not reweigh that evidence.

The court also upheld the administrative law judge’s decision to find Dr. Megan Scheibe’s opinion unpersuasive. Dr. Scheibe had opined that Shari B. could sit for only one hour in an eight-hour day and could never perform postural, reaching, or manipulative activities. The court found that the administrative law judge adequately considered the opinion’s supportability and consistency, Dr. Scheibe’s limited treatment relationship with Shari B., the conservative course of treatment, and relatively normal physical-examination findings.

The court found a material deficiency in the administrative law judge’s determination that Shari B. could sit for eight hours in an eight-hour workday with normal breaks. Shari B. had testified that sitting caused problems with her hip, knees, and ankles and that she could sit upright for roughly 15 minutes at a time. None of the medical experts believed she could sit for eight hours, and the administrative law judge did not identify evidence supporting that conclusion. The court found that the administrative law judge failed to provide a logical explanation connecting the evidence to the sitting limitation and directed the administrative law judge to explain the conclusion on remand.

The court also found insufficient evidence supporting the step-five finding that Shari B. could perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. The administrative law judge identified 18,000 jobs total—4,000 printed circuit board taper jobs, 6,000 assembler jobs, and 8,000 printed circuit board screener jobs—but did not evaluate whether those jobs existed in Shari B.’s local or regional economy. Because the job total was borderline and the record contained no regional job numbers or evidence of additional representative occupations, the court directed the Commissioner to supplement the record.

Finally, the court upheld the finding that anxiety was non-severe. It found substantial evidence in the lack of ongoing mental-health treatment after the alleged onset date and the opinions of two state-agency psychological consultants. But the court found reversible error in the failure to address osteoporosis. The administrative record included the later diagnosis, yet the administrative law judge did not decide whether osteoporosis was a medically determinable impairment, whether it was severe, or whether it affected the residual functional capacity.

Disposition

The court’s order states that Shari B.’s motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. The Commissioner’s denial of benefits was reversed, and the matter was remanded under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings. Shari B.’s motion was denied in all other respects. The Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment was denied. Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster directed that judgment be entered accordingly.