Jeffrey P. v. Kijakazi

Background

Jeffrey P. applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging disability based on depression, bipolar disorder II, anxiety, sleep apnea, type II diabetes, high blood pressure, left hip pain, and right knee pain. After an administrative hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found severe impairments including obesity, an eating disorder, major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, personality disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. The ALJ found diabetes, obstructive sleep apnea, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia non-severe.

The ALJ determined that Jeffrey P. could perform medium work with restrictions, including only occasional kneeling, crawling, and crouching; simple, routine tasks; occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors; no tandem tasks with coworkers; and no interaction with the general public. Although the ALJ found that he could not return to his prior work, the ALJ found that he could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, including hand packager, machine packager, and meat clerk. The ALJ therefore found him not disabled, and the Appeals Council declined review.

Issues and Analysis

Jeffrey P. argued that the ALJ failed to fully develop the record at the third step of the disability analysis by not obtaining testimony or written responses from a medical expert. The court rejected that argument. It explained that a claimant bears the burden of showing that an impairment meets or medically equals a listed impairment, and that the ALJ did not have to obtain medical-expert evidence when the record did not reasonably support such a finding.

Jeffrey P. also challenged the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Jeffrey Kearney’s opinion that employment appeared unlikely given Jeffrey P.’s symptoms. The court found that the ALJ reasonably considered the opinion and identified several supportable reasons for finding it unpersuasive: it was conclusory, lacked a function-by-function analysis, addressed functioning at the time of the examination rather than over a twelve-month period, conflicted with other treatment observations and the treatment history, and concerned an issue reserved to the Commissioner.

The court also rejected challenges to the residual functional capacity determination. It found that the ALJ considered Jeffrey P.’s residence in an adult foster home and the portions of the record concerning his daily activities and social interactions. The court stated that disagreement about how the evidence should be weighed did not show a lack of substantial evidence, particularly because the ALJ included social-interaction restrictions in the residual functional capacity.

Finally, the court rejected the challenge to the vocational expert’s testimony. Because the residual functional capacity was supported by substantial evidence, the court found that the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert was properly phrased.

Disposition

The court applied the substantial-evidence standard, under which it must affirm when the record could support two inconsistent positions and one is the ALJ’s finding. Judge Dulce J. Foster denied Jeffrey P.’s motion for summary judgment, granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, affirmed the Commissioner’s decision, and dismissed Jeffrey P.’s complaint with prejudice. The order directed that judgment be entered accordingly.