Goyette v. City of Minneapolis

Background

Plaintiffs Jared Goyette, Craig Lassig, Tannen Maury, Stephen Maturen, Katie Nelson, Edward Ou, Tim Evans, and Chris Tuite challenged law-enforcement treatment of journalists and other members of the news media covering protests and unrest following the deaths of George Floyd and Daunte Wright. The defendants relevant to these motions were Hennepin County Sheriff David Hutchinson, the City of Minneapolis, and former Minneapolis Police Chief Medaria Arradondo.

The opinion describes coordinated operations involving the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office, the Minneapolis Police Department, the Minnesota State Patrol, and other agencies. Plaintiffs alleged that journalists were arrested, detained, pepper-sprayed, struck by projectiles, threatened, ordered to disperse despite a curfew exemption for the press, and otherwise prevented from observing and reporting on the events. The opinion particularly discusses the detention and curfew citations of Lassig, Maturen, and Maury; alleged conduct toward Goyette and Nelson during the George Floyd protests; and alleged pepper-spraying, physical restraint, and removal of Evans, along with the grabbing and removal of Tuite, during the Daunte Wright protests.

Witness declarations

Sheriff Hutchinson asked the court to exclude declarations from Chandan Khanna, Jon Stegenga, and Michael Elliot because the witnesses were not listed in the plaintiffs’ initial disclosures under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. The court found the omission harmless because the witnesses and at least some of the information they provided had been made known during discovery or earlier filings. The court also found that Elliot was used solely to challenge Hutchinson’s declaration. The court therefore denied Hutchinson’s request to exclude the declarations.

Summary-judgment standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute about a fact that matters to the case and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing each motion. A genuine factual dispute exists when a reasonable jury could decide for that party.

Sheriff Hutchinson: individual-capacity claims

The plaintiffs brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against state or local officials for violations of constitutional rights. Hutchinson asserted qualified immunity, a legal protection for government officials unless their conduct violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time.

The court granted Hutchinson’s qualified-immunity defense as to the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims brought by Lassig, Maturen, and Maury. The court found no evidence that Hutchinson was directly involved in, or had notice of a pattern of, unconstitutional acts by Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office deputies during the George Floyd protests. The court denied the defense in all other respects. As to Evans and Tuite, the court found a genuine dispute about whether Hutchinson knew of a pattern of unconstitutional conduct during the Daunte Wright protests and whether he was directly involved.

The court denied Hutchinson’s motion on the plaintiffs’ civil-conspiracy claims. The evidence was circumstantial, but the court concluded that the coordinated command structures used by the agencies created a genuine factual dispute about whether a conspiracy existed to deprive the plaintiffs of constitutional rights.

The court granted Hutchinson’s motion on the failure-to-intervene claims brought by Lassig, Maturen, and Maury because the record did not show that Hutchinson knew their rights were being violated when they were arrested. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part as to the failure-to-intervene claims overall. For Evans and Tuite, the court found a genuine dispute about whether Hutchinson knew journalists’ rights were being violated and had an opportunity to intervene.

Sheriff Hutchinson: official-capacity claims

An official-capacity claim is generally treated as a claim against the government entity represented by the official. The plaintiffs argued that their injuries resulted from an official policy, an unofficial custom, or a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise Hennepin County personnel. The court found evidence supporting a genuine dispute about whether such a policy, custom, or failure existed and caused the alleged constitutional violations. The court therefore denied Hutchinson’s motion as to the official-capacity claims.

Injunctive and declaratory relief against Hutchinson

The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, meaning a court order directing future conduct, and declaratory relief, meaning a formal declaration of legal rights. The court granted Hutchinson’s motion as to each named plaintiff’s claims for this relief. It held that the plaintiffs had not shown a real and immediate threat of future harm that such relief could address. The court also noted that the plaintiffs sought this relief individually, not as a class, and that the evidence did not show Hutchinson or the Sheriff’s Office posed a sufficiently likely future threat to them.

City of Minneapolis and former Chief Arradondo

The court denied the City Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Regarding municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, the court found evidence that could support a continuing and widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct by Minneapolis police, notice to policymakers, deliberate indifference, and a causal connection between that conduct and the plaintiffs’ injuries. The court also found factual disputes concerning whether other constitutional rights were violated.

The court allowed the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims to proceed. It found that reporting on government conduct was protected activity and that alleged physical attacks, threats, and obstruction could deter a journalist from continuing to report. The court also found evidence from which a jury could infer retaliatory motive, including alleged targeting of identifiable journalists and conduct despite the press exemption from the curfew.

The court also allowed Goyette’s and Nelson’s Fourth Amendment claims to proceed. It found evidence that Goyette was intentionally shot in the face and that Nelson was subjected to coordinated efforts involving less-lethal projectiles, chemical irritants, and other tactics. Whether seizures occurred, whether they were unreasonable, and whether a municipal custom caused them were factual issues for a jury.

The court rejected summary judgment on the failure-to-intervene claim against the City Defendants. It found evidence of a recurring pattern in which Minneapolis police officers and leadership allegedly failed to intervene during excessive force against journalists. The court also denied summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment claims, finding factual disputes about whether the conduct was deliberately injurious, conscience-shocking, and part of established procedures rather than random acts.

Finally, the court denied summary judgment on the civil-conspiracy claim against the City Defendants. The unified command structure, collective decision-making, and alleged disregard of the press’s curfew exemption provided circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer an agreement among the City Defendants and other agencies to interfere with the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Order

The court ordered that Hutchinson’s motion for summary judgment was GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. It was granted as to Lassig, Maturen, and Maury’s First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims and failure-to-intervene claims; granted as to each named plaintiff’s injunctive and declaratory relief claims against Hutchinson; and denied as to the remaining claims. The City Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was DENIED. The plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the record was DENIED as moot, and the City Defendants’ application to file conventionally was GRANTED.