Goyette v. City of Minneapolis

Background

The plaintiffs are journalists who challenged law-enforcement treatment of journalists and news-media members covering protests and civil unrest following the deaths of George Floyd and Daunte Wright. The case concerns the actions of the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office, the Minneapolis Police Department, the Minnesota State Patrol, and other agencies during coordinated protest responses.

The plaintiffs alleged that journalists were arrested, detained, pepper-sprayed, struck with projectiles, threatened, ordered to disperse, and otherwise prevented from observing and reporting on the protests. The opinion describes, among other incidents, the detention and curfew citations of Lassig, Maury, and Maturen during the George Floyd protests, and alleged pepper-spraying, physical restraint, and other force against Evans during the Daunte Wright protests. The opinion also discusses alleged force and interference involving Goyette, Nelson, Tuite, and other journalists.

Witness declarations

Sheriff Hutchinson asked the court to exclude declarations from Chandan Khanna, Jon Stegenga, and Michael Elliot because the plaintiffs had not identified them in their initial disclosures under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. The court concluded that the omission was harmless because the witnesses and the information they provided had been at least partially disclosed during discovery or otherwise made known to Hutchinson. The court also concluded that Elliot was an impeachment witness whose testimony was used solely to challenge Hutchinson’s declaration. The court denied Hutchinson’s request to exclude the declarations.

Summary-judgment standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing each motion.

Sheriff Hutchinson’s individual-capacity claims

The plaintiffs asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute allowing lawsuits against state or local officials for violating federal rights. They alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as conspiracy and failure to intervene.

Hutchinson asserted qualified immunity, which can protect a government official from personal liability unless the official violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. The parties did not dispute that the constitutional rights at issue were clearly established. The court therefore focused on whether the evidence could show that Hutchinson violated those rights or was responsible as a supervisor.

For Lassig, Maturen, and Maury, the court found no evidence that Hutchinson was directly involved in, or had notice of, a pattern of unconstitutional acts by Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office deputies during the George Floyd protests. The court granted Hutchinson’s qualified-immunity defense as to their Section 1983 claims alleging First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations. It also granted summary judgment to Hutchinson on their failure-to-intervene claims because the record did not show that he knew their rights were being violated when there was an opportunity to prevent the harm.

For Evans and Tuite, the court found a genuine dispute about whether Hutchinson knew of a pattern of unconstitutional acts during the Daunte Wright protests and whether he was directly involved. The court therefore denied summary judgment on those claims.

Conspiracy claims

A civil-conspiracy claim under Section 1983 requires evidence that defendants agreed to deprive a person of constitutional rights, that at least one conspirator took an action to further the agreement, and that the action caused injury. The court found that the coordinated work of law-enforcement agencies through the Multi-Agency Command Center and Operation Safety Net, together with other circumstantial evidence, created a genuine factual dispute about whether a conspiracy existed. The court denied Hutchinson’s motion for summary judgment on the conspiracy claims.

Failure-to-intervene claims involving Evans and Tuite

The court stated that officers have a duty to intervene to prevent excessive force when they have an opportunity to do so. It found a genuine dispute about whether Hutchinson knew journalists’ constitutional rights were being violated during the Daunte Wright protests and failed to intervene. The court granted Hutchinson’s motion in part and denied it in part on the failure-to-intervene claims: it granted the motion as to Lassig, Maturen, and Maury, and denied it as to the remaining claims.

Official-capacity claims

The plaintiffs also sued Hutchinson in his official capacity. Such a claim generally functions as a claim against the governmental entity represented by the official. The plaintiffs argued that their injuries resulted from an official policy, an unofficial custom, or a deliberate failure to train or supervise.

The court found evidence that could support an official policy, unofficial custom, or deliberate failure to train or supervise that caused the alleged constitutional violations against Evans and Tuite. It therefore denied Hutchinson’s motion for summary judgment on the official-capacity claims.

Injunctive and declaratory relief

The plaintiffs sought court orders addressing future conduct. The court held that they had not shown a real and immediate threat of future harm that such relief could redress. The court also noted that the plaintiffs sought this relief individually, not as a class, and that the opinion did not identify evidence showing that Hutchinson or the Sheriff’s Office posed a sufficiently likely future threat to them. The court granted Hutchinson’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ injunctive and declaratory relief claims.

Claims against the City Defendants

The City of Minneapolis and former Chief Arradondo sought summary judgment on claims involving municipal liability, the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, failure to intervene, the Fourteenth Amendment, and conspiracy.

For municipal liability, often called Monell liability, a plaintiff must show that a constitutional violation resulted from an official policy, an unofficial custom, or a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. The court found evidence of a continuing and widespread pattern of alleged unconstitutional misconduct by Minneapolis police, evidence that City Defendants may have known about that pattern and failed to take appropriate corrective action, and evidence connecting the alleged custom to the plaintiffs’ injuries. The court denied summary judgment on the Monell claims.

The court also found factual disputes concerning the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims. It held that reporting is protected activity and that the alleged physical attacks, threats, obstruction, and other conduct toward journalists could deter a journalist of ordinary firmness from continuing to report. Evidence of hostile comments, intentional targeting, and the failure to communicate that journalists were exempt from the curfew could support an inference of retaliatory motive. The court concluded that these issues should be resolved by a jury and denied summary judgment on the First Amendment claims.

Regarding the Fourth Amendment, the court found that Goyette and Nelson presented evidence of seizures. It determined that the alleged intentional shooting of Goyette in the face could objectively show an intent to restrain, and that the alleged coordinated use of rubber bullets, tear gas, and flash bangs against Nelson could also support a seizure. The reasonableness of the seizures and the City’s potential municipal liability were disputed factual issues. The court denied summary judgment on these claims.

The court further found evidence of a recurring pattern in which Minneapolis police officers and leadership allegedly failed to intervene during excessive force against journalists. It denied summary judgment on the failure-to-intervene claim against the City Defendants.

For the Fourteenth Amendment claims, the court found that evidence of deliberate targeting, intentional force, and statements by officers could support a claim that the conduct was sufficiently shocking to the conscience. The court also concluded that the alleged repeated and widespread violence did not appear random when the evidence was viewed in the plaintiffs’ favor, creating a factual dispute concerning procedural due process. The court denied summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment claims.

Finally, the court found circumstantial evidence supporting an inference that the Minneapolis Police Department, the State Patrol, and other agencies agreed to interfere with journalists’ constitutional rights. The unified command structure, coordinated decision-making, and alleged disregard of the curfew exemption for journalists created factual disputes that prevented summary judgment on the conspiracy claim. The court denied the City Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety.

Order

The court ordered that Hutchinson’s motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. It was granted as to Lassig, Maturen, and Maury’s Section 1983 claims alleging First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations and failure to intervene; granted as to each named plaintiff’s injunctive and declaratory relief claims against Hutchinson; and denied as to the remaining claims. The court denied the City Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, denied the plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the record as moot, and granted the City Defendants’ application to file conventionally.