Daywitt v. Harpestead

Background

Pro se plaintiffs, described as civilly committed clients of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP), sued Jodi Harpstead and other defendants. They challenged three MSOP technology policies: clients could receive electronic messages through the C-Mail program but could not send outgoing emails; clients could not access the internet except for approved purposes; and videoconferencing was limited to specified visits, including visits with someone on their deathbed or clinically supported visits. Plaintiffs claimed that these policies violated First Amendment rights involving internet access and religious practice.

Plaintiffs retained Patrick O’Leary as an expert. Defendants moved to exclude him, and both sides moved for summary judgment. A magistrate judge recommended excluding O’Leary, denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs objected, so the district court reviewed the recommendations de novo, meaning it conducted its own review rather than simply accepting the earlier analysis.

Expert testimony

The court concluded that the magistrate judge’s analysis of O’Leary’s expert testimony was correct. It overruled plaintiffs’ objection to excluding the expert.

First Amendment claims

The court held that the modified Turner factors applied to constitutional claims brought by civil commitment clients. The Turner test asks whether a restriction is reasonably connected to legitimate institutional interests, whether alternative ways to exercise the right remain available, whether accommodating the right would affect other clients and staff, and whether an effective alternative would impose only minimal cost on the institution’s legitimate interests. For civil commitment, the relevant interests are nonpunitive interests such as institutional order, safety, security, treatment, and rehabilitation, rather than punishment or deterrence.

Applying that test, the court concluded that MSOP’s restrictions were rationally connected to rehabilitation and institutional security. The court relied on concerns that some clients could use the internet for countertherapeutic purposes, sexual communications with vulnerable people, harassment, or other improper activity. It also cited evidence that MSOP lacked the resources to monitor websites, emails, and video calls adequately.

The court found that plaintiffs retained alternative ways to communicate and obtain information, including conventional mail, telephone calls, in-person visits, newspapers, television, and radio. It also found that accommodating unrestricted internet access could affect MSOP’s ability to protect public safety, maintain facility security, and prevent access to prohibited or countertherapeutic materials. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs had not identified a sufficient alternative because categorical website blocking would still require monitoring and would not reliably block every prohibited site. The court therefore held that the MSOP policies did not violate the First Amendment right to obtain information through internet access.

The court separately rejected plaintiffs’ religious free-exercise claim. It held that plaintiffs had not shown that the MSOP policies substantially burdened their ability to practice their religious beliefs.

Disposition

Judge Brasel overruled plaintiffs’ objection to the Report and Recommendation and accepted it. The court granted defendants’ motion to exclude plaintiffs’ expert, denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the action with prejudice. The court directed that judgment be entered accordingly.