Daniel v. Honeywell International Inc.

Background

Ahmad Daniel represented himself. He had been employed by Honeywell International Inc. Honeywell adopted a COVID-19 vaccination policy. Daniel objected to vaccination on religious grounds and requested an exemption, which Honeywell granted. Honeywell required employees who remained unvaccinated to follow a COVID-19 testing protocol. Daniel objected to and refused that testing. Honeywell treated his noncompliance as a voluntary resignation and terminated his employment.

Claims and pleading problems

Daniel’s amended complaint asserted 21 claims, including claims under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act whistleblower provision, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, the Minnesota Genetic Testing in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Minnesota Human Rights Act, the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and several other federal and Minnesota authorities. He also asserted constitutional, contract, wage, and data-related claims.

The court held that the amended complaint violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires a short and plain statement showing entitlement to relief. The complaint was 118 paragraphs long, included at least 21 claims, and did not clearly identify which facts supported which claims or what each defendant allegedly did. The court said the entire amended complaint could be dismissed on that basis. It specifically dismissed the claim based on regulations identified as “45 CFR Parts 160 and 164” because Daniel’s wholesale reference to those regulations did not give the defendants fair notice of the legal basis for the claim.

The court also held that Daniel waived opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss by failing to file the required memorandum of law. His motion for leave to file a second amended complaint did not serve as a response to the motion to dismiss.

Reasons individual claims failed

The court concluded that several asserted authorities did not provide Daniel a private right of action, meaning a legal right to sue in court. These included the joint congressional resolution designating 1983 as the national Year of the Bible, the Nuremberg Code, the criminal statutes on which Daniel relied, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act provision because enforcement authority belonged exclusively to the Secretary. The court also held that Minn. Stat. § 144.335, which had been repealed in 2007, could not provide a cause of action for the later conduct alleged.

The court held that Daniel’s Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims required conduct fairly attributable to a state actor, and that the amended complaint did not allege that any defendant was a state actor. The court likewise found no allegations connecting the defendants to the governmental entities covered by the Minnesota statutes concerning biological specimens and health data, DNA evidence, public-entity discrimination against contractors, and government data practices.

The remaining claims lacked plausible factual support. The Minnesota whistleblower claim did not allege protected conduct, such as a good-faith report of a suspected legal violation, or a connection between such conduct and Daniel’s termination. The Title VII religious-accommodation claim did not plausibly allege why the testing requirement conflicted with a bona fide religious belief. The court stated that the Minnesota Human Rights Act claim would fail for the same reason because such claims are generally analyzed under the same standard as Title VII claims.

The court found that Daniel’s Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act claim failed because he alleged that he refused testing; therefore, Honeywell did not obtain genetic information from testing that it could have used against him. His Minnesota genetic-testing claim was conclusory because he did not explain why the required testing fit the statute’s definition of a genetic test. His Americans with Disabilities Act claim failed because he did not allege that he had a disability. His National Labor Relations Act claim did not identify an intelligible unfair-labor-practice theory. His contract claim did not allege a contract or a breach. His wage claim consisted of a conclusory statement about unpaid leave and did not identify the timing, amount, or reason he believed payment was owed.

Motion to amend and disposition

The court denied Daniel’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. The motion did not comply with two local rules: it lacked required supporting materials, including a memorandum of law and other filing documents, and it did not include a marked-up version showing how the proposed complaint differed from the existing complaint. The court also found that the proposed pleading, which was 56 pages and 253 paragraphs, did not address the problems in the first amended complaint and instead compounded them.

The court chose dismissal with prejudice, meaning the claims could not be refiled in that action. It reasoned that Daniel had already received one opportunity to amend, that each claim failed for a basic reason or reasons, that he did not respond to the dismissal motion, and that his proposed second amended complaint did not show how the defects could be repaired.

The order therefore did three things: it GRANTED the defendants’ motion to dismiss; it DENIED Daniel’s motion to amend the complaint; and it DISMISSED the amended complaint WITH PREJUDICE. The court directed that judgment be entered.