Larson v. Walz

Background

Minnesota adopted a policy requiring certain employees, including Michael Larson, to provide proof of full COVID-19 vaccination or periodically submit to COVID-19 testing. The policy applied to Minnesota State Colleges and Universities employees assigned to work at the workplace or seeking to access it for more than 10 minutes. Larson was a full-time English instructor at Minnesota State College Southeast.

Larson identified himself as Roman Catholic and requested a religious exemption from mask wearing, COVID-19 testing, and mRNA injections. He submitted a statement describing his religious convictions about bodily integrity and consent, along with a letter from his priest supporting his request. After initially stating that there was no religious exemption, the college later invited Larson to propose accommodations.

Larson proposed three options: an exemption from the policy, moving his hybrid course entirely online, or assigning another instructor to the hybrid course and compensating him with additional teaching the following semester. The college rejected all three proposals as unreasonable. It suspended Larson without pay on September 22, 2021, and terminated him on December 3, 2021.

Larson filed six claims: religious discrimination and failure to accommodate under Title VII; substantive and procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; violation of equal protection; wrongful termination; and breach of contract based on an alleged contractual 15-day limit on suspensions. He sought damages and declaratory relief. Larson sued the individual defendants only in their official capacities and represented himself.

The defendants’ motion

The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. They also relied on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court explained that, when this immunity issue is presented as a jurisdictional challenge, it is analyzed under Rule 12(b)(1), which concerns federal subject-matter jurisdiction.

Counts II through VI

The court determined that Minnesota State College Southeast is an instrumentality of the State of Minnesota for Eleventh Amendment purposes. The Eleventh Amendment therefore barred Larson’s claims against the college in federal court. It also barred claims seeking damages from state employees sued in their official capacities because such suits are treated as suits against the state entity itself.

Larson argued that the exception recognized in Ex parte Young allowed him to seek declaratory relief against the officials. That exception can permit prospective relief against state officials for an ongoing violation of federal law. The court found that Larson sought only retrospective relief based on events in 2021. He did not allege that the policy remained in effect or that he faced a future state-mandated medical intervention. His requested declarations concerned alleged past violations and therefore did not fit the exception.

The court consequently dismissed Counts II through VI without prejudice because they were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Count I: Title VII religious-discrimination claim

Title VII is a federal law that prohibits employers from discriminating because of religion and requires reasonable accommodation of religious observance or practice unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, Larson did not need to prove his claim. He needed to allege facts making it plausible.

The court found that Larson plausibly alleged a religious-discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claim. His amended complaint and attached exhibits connected his objections to vaccination and testing with his Roman Catholic faith and his beliefs about bodily integrity. He alleged that he informed the college of the conflict, proposed accommodations, and was terminated for refusing to comply with the policy.

The defendants argued that Larson’s objections were secular or medical rather than religious. The court rejected that argument at this stage. It found that Larson’s statements about the perceived harms and effectiveness of vaccines and testing did not necessarily sever the connection between his bodily-autonomy beliefs and his religious objections. Whether his objections were religious was described as a fact-intensive issue generally not suitable for resolution on a motion to dismiss.

The court also addressed which defendants could be sued under Title VII. It stated that Title VII liability attaches to employers, not individual defendants. Larson did not object to dismissing Count I against Marsha Danielson, Chad Dull, and Megan Zeches. The court therefore dismissed Count I with prejudice as to those three defendants. The claim remained against Minnesota State College Southeast, his former employer. The opinion states that Count I was brought against the college and those three individuals; it does not identify the Governor or Chancellor as defendants to Count I.

Disposition

The order granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. Counts II through VI were dismissed without prejudice. Count I was dismissed with prejudice as to Danielson, Dull, and Zeches. The motion was denied as to Count I against Minnesota State College Southeast.