Ugorets v. City of Shorewood

Background

Alex and Elena Ugorets’ property is located entirely in the City of Tonka Bay. Its front connects to Brentwood Avenue, while the rear borders the Timber Lane public right of way, which is entirely within the City of Shorewood. The paved portion of Timber Lane is about 30 feet from the Ugorets’ property line, across grassy land within the right of way.

The Ugorets generally used Brentwood Avenue but had occasionally used the rear access from Timber Lane for vehicle or boat storage, contractors, home-improvement work, and access to an underground garage that could be reached by vehicle only from the rear. They had used that access for about 13 years. In 2016, they applied to Shorewood for a permit concerning that use, but the City denied the application. In 2020, some neighbors asked Shorewood to block the access. The City later installed wooden bollards along the west side of Timber Lane, preventing vehicles from reaching the Ugorets’ property from that street.

The Ugorets sued under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A claim under § 1983 allows a person to seek relief for a constitutional violation by a government actor. Only the takings claim remained. Both sides moved for summary judgment, which is a decision without a trial when there is no genuine dispute over an important fact and one side is entitled to judgment under the law.

Property Right of Access

The court first considered whether the Ugorets had a protected property interest. The parties focused on Minnesota’s “center line” presumption, under which a person who buys land bordering a street may generally be presumed to own the land beneath the street to its center. The court rejected that presumption here. Timber Lane was created entirely within the Timber Lane Plat by a single grantor, and the street was dedicated as a public right of way. Because the street was laid out wholly on another’s land, the court held that the center-line presumption did not apply.

The court nevertheless held that the Ugorets had an easement right of access. Under Minnesota law, an owner whose property borders a public street has a special property interest in the street, including an easement for access, light, and air, even if the owner does not own the land beneath the street. The court also rejected Shorewood’s argument that the City’s authority to manage a public road allowed it to block the access indefinitely after the street had been developed as a public street. The court concluded that the Ugorets had an easement giving them access to Timber Lane.

Taking

The court next held that Shorewood’s bollards constituted a taking of that access right. Minnesota law generally treats depriving an owner of access from an abutting street as a taking requiring compensation. The relevant question was whether the Ugorets retained reasonable or reasonably convenient access, considering the circumstances of their property.

The court identified three considerations. First, the rear access was an important and distinctive feature of the property. The property had a rear garage accessible only from that direction, and the second access point could assist emergency responders. Second, the remaining front access was not reasonably adequate for the Ugorets’ intended uses: reaching the rear garage from the front was impossible, and bringing contractors, equipment, or materials to the rear was more difficult, time-consuming, costly, or impossible. Third, Shorewood’s stated public purposes—preserving parking, regulating traffic, and maintaining emergency access—were not sufficiently supported by the record. The court noted that the bollards could reduce parking space and interfere with emergency access, and that the record showed City staff had initially been directed to develop a plan to stop the Ugorets’ access without identifying a broader public-improvement purpose.

Considering all the circumstances, the court held that the bollards obstructing vehicle access to the Ugorets’ property amounted to an unconstitutional taking of their right to access Timber Lane.

Remedies

The court addressed money damages and injunctive relief separately. As to money damages, the parties disputed the effect of the blocked access on the property’s value and the Ugorets’ increased costs for storage, construction, and other uses. The court held that these factual disputes prevented summary judgment for either side. A jury would have to determine the property’s fair market value before and after the taking and could consider other evidence affecting that value. Any damages proceeding would be limited to losses incurred while the bollards were in place.

As to injunctive relief—an order requiring or prohibiting conduct—the court concluded that money damages were not a complete, practical, and efficient remedy. The bollards caused a recurring injury each time the Ugorets needed the access but could not use it, and the nature and cost of future injuries would vary depending on when and why access was needed. The court therefore held that the Ugorets could receive an injunction and were entitled to that relief.

Order

The court denied Shorewood’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety. It granted the Ugorets’ motion for summary judgment as to the existence and taking of their property right, but denied the motion as to money damages. The court left the damages question for trial and ordered Shorewood to remove the bollards within 20 days. Any future interference with the Ugorets’ access must comply with the order and applicable federal, state, and local law.