Kristina N. v. Kijakazi

Background

Kristina N. applied for Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income benefits on November 29, 2019. She alleged that she became unable to work on April 1, 2012, because of bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression, and bipolar depression. She was represented by an attorney at the Administrative Law Judge hearing.

The Administrative Law Judge found several severe mental impairments, including bipolar disorder, depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, cluster B personality disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that none met or medically equaled a listed impairment. The judge found that Kristina N. could perform a full range of work with restrictions, including understanding, remembering, and applying only simple instructions; having occasional simple and succinct interactions with others; and responding to routine workplace changes. Because she had no past relevant work, the Administrative Law Judge found that she could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy and was therefore not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review.

Issues

Kristina N. argued that the Administrative Law Judge failed to include all limitations identified by agency mental-health consultants Kiela Bolden and Marci Mylan, including moderate limitations involving concentration, persistence, pace, attendance, and maintaining a consistent work pace. She also argued that the Administrative Law Judge did not adequately explain the evaluation of the opinions of Bolden, Mylan, and Jay Phillippi.

Court’s analysis

The court reviewed the Commissioner’s decision under the substantial-evidence standard. That standard asks whether the record contains relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate support for the decision.

The court held that the residual functional capacity finding was supported by substantial evidence. It explained that an Administrative Law Judge is not required to adopt every limitation proposed by an expert, even when the expert’s opinion is given substantial weight. The court concluded that the restriction to simple instructions was consistent with moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace. It also concluded that the consultants’ moderate limitations on completing a workday and maintaining pace did not mean that Kristina N. was unable to sustain a job. The consultants had noted that her claims about inability to maintain pace were inconsistent with her daily activities.

The court further held that the Administrative Law Judge properly addressed Kristina N.’s ability to maintain pace and reasonably rejected the more restrictive opinion that she would miss several workdays each month. The Administrative Law Judge found that opinion unsupported by the record and not persuasive.

The court also concluded that the Administrative Law Judge adequately considered the required factors for evaluating medical opinions, particularly supportability and consistency. The Administrative Law Judge had discussed Kristina N.’s treatment history, generally normal mental-status examinations, daily activities, and improvement when she followed her medication regimen. The Administrative Law Judge found Bolden’s and Mylan’s opinions generally consistent with the record but restated their limitations in terms suitable for the residual functional capacity assessment. The Administrative Law Judge found Phillippi’s opinion unpersuasive because it was based on a single examination, relied excessively on Kristina N.’s reported symptoms, conflicted with the record, and conflicted with the generally intact mental-status examination performed by Phillippi.

Disposition

The court granted Defendant Kilolo Kijakazi’s motion for summary judgment, denied Plaintiff Kristina N.’s motion for judgment, and dismissed the matter with prejudice. The judgment left in place the determination that Kristina N. was not disabled under the Social Security Act.