Kyle R. v. Kijakazi

Background

Kyle R. applied for Supplemental Security Income benefits on July 31, 2018. He initially alleged disability beginning January 1, 2015, and later amended the alleged onset date to July 31, 2018. He attributed his claimed inability to work to lymphoma and complications from its treatment, as well as insomnia, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and spinal and chest fractures.

The Social Security Administration denied the application initially and on reconsideration. After two hearings, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Kyle R. had several severe impairments, including spinal fractures and degenerative disc disease, effects of lymphoma and chemotherapy, endocarditis, depression, anxiety, panic disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, opioid dependence, and cannabis use disorder. The ALJ found that none of the impairments met or medically equaled a listed impairment. The ALJ determined that Kyle R. could perform sedentary work with physical and mental restrictions, including simple, routine, repetitive tasks and only occasional, superficial contact with others. Although Kyle R. had no past work history, the ALJ found that jobs existed in the national economy that he could perform and concluded that he was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review.

Issues and analysis

The court reviewed the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether it was supported by substantial evidence, meaning relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate. Kyle R. challenged the ALJ’s evaluation of psychological and medical opinions, the residual functional capacity determination, and the vocational evidence concerning available jobs.

The court held that the ALJ improperly evaluated consulting psychologist Tatyana Karpyak’s opinion. Dr. Karpyak reported significant difficulties with concentration and attention, including Kyle R.’s inability to spell “world” backward, complete serial sevens, and solve two of four simple arithmetic problems. She concluded that his emotional and cognitive difficulties would significantly reduce his ability to perform work-related duties with adequate persistence and pace and would limit his ability to tolerate work-related stress.

The ALJ found Dr. Karpyak’s opinion unsupported and unpersuasive, stating that the examination’s cognitive findings were normal. The court found that characterization incorrect. The court also held that the ALJ failed to perform the analysis required by the regulations, including explaining the opinion’s supportability and consistency with other evidence. The court noted that the ALJ did not acknowledge Dr. Karpyak’s expertise as a consulting examiner, her direct testing of Kyle R., or specific evidence inconsistent with her opinion.

The court found a similar error in the ALJ’s treatment of the opinion from Kyle R.’s treating physician, Glenn Buttermann, M.D. The ALJ discounted the opinion because it appeared on a check-box form but did not address the supporting narrative comments. The physician opined that Kyle R. could sit and stand for less than two hours each during an eight-hour workday, would need frequent 10- to 20-minute breaks, and would need to lie down as needed. The court noted that vocational-expert testimony indicated that lying down during the day would not be allowed in sedentary work.

The court also held that the ALJ failed to analyze whether Dr. Buttermann’s opinion was consistent with the medical evidence. The court explained that this required comparing the medical opinion with other medical evidence, not merely finding that Kyle R.’s and his father’s testimony was not wholly credible.

Because reconsideration of the medical and psychological evidence required a remand, the court did not decide Kyle R.’s alternative arguments about the residual functional capacity assessment or vocational evidence. The court stated that, on remand, all vocational evidence must be considered and any residual functional capacity finding must be based on supporting medical evidence.

Disposition

Judge Wilhelmina M. Wright denied Defendant Kilolo Kijakazi’s motion for summary judgment, granted Plaintiff Kyle R.’s motion for summary judgment, and remanded the matter to the Commissioner under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The order did not award benefits or decide that Kyle R. was disabled; it required further consideration by the Commissioner.