Cheng v. Grenier
- Wilhelmina Wright
- 0:23-cv-00485
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 12
In Cheng v. Grenier, Judge Wright granted dismissal, dismissing Cheng’s constitutional claims with prejudice and his tort claims without prejudice.
Sheng-Wen Cheng’s constitutional claims against P. Grenier and his negligence and misrepresentation claims against the United States were dismissed; the constitutional claims were dismissed with prejudice, and the tort claims were dismissed without prejudice.
What happened
Sheng-Wen Cheng, a federal inmate, sued Bureau of Prisons counselor P. Grenier and the United States. He alleged that Grenier interfered with his prison grievance process and access to the courts, violating his constitutional rights, and that the United States was liable for negligence and misrepresentation.
The court found that Cheng alleged enough facts to suggest the prison grievance process may have been unavailable to him, so it did not dismiss the case for failing to complete the prison grievance process. But it declined to recognize a damages claim against Grenier under the constitutional remedy Cheng invoked. The court also ruled that the misrepresentation claim was not allowed under the Federal Tort Claims Act and that Cheng filed his negligence claim before completing that Act’s required administrative process.
Judge Wilhelmina M. Wright granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Claims one through three were dismissed with prejudice, while claims four and five were dismissed without prejudice.
The detailed version
- Cheng v. Grenier · No. 0:23-cv-00485
- Wilhelmina Wright
- Jan. 16, 2024
Background
Sheng-Wen Cheng, a federal inmate serving a 72-month sentence for fraud against the United States, sued P. Grenier, a Bureau of Prisons counselor, and the United States. Cheng sued Grenier in both his individual and official capacities. After Cheng was transferred from FCI Sandstone to FMC Rochester, he conceded that his requests for a declaration and an injunction were moot; the court therefore did not address those requests.
Cheng alleged that, between November 2022 and February 2023, Grenier interfered with his use of the prison’s administrative grievance process and limited his access to the courts. The alleged conduct included threatening to move Cheng to an inferior housing unit if he submitted an informal grievance, failing to respond to informal grievances, refusing to provide a required grievance form, providing incorrect forms, and refusing to respond to requests related to Cheng’s lawsuits. Cheng asserted two First Amendment claims, a Fifth Amendment due-process claim, and claims for negligence and misrepresentation.
Administrative Exhaustion
The Prison Litigation Reform Act generally requires a prisoner to fully and properly use available prison grievance procedures before filing a lawsuit about prison conditions. Defendants argued that Cheng failed to do so. Cheng responded that Grenier’s conduct made the process unavailable.
The court held that Cheng pleaded enough facts to raise an inference that the grievance process was unavailable. Cheng alleged that Grenier failed to respond to his informal grievances and refused to provide the next required form. The parties submitted conflicting declarations about whether Grenier was the only person who could provide that form, and the Bureau of Prisons’ program statement said that the correctional counselor ordinarily provides it. Because of those allegations and the conflicting evidence, the court found no factual basis to dismiss Cheng’s claims for failure to exhaust the prison grievance process.
Constitutional Claims and Bivens
Cheng asked the court to recognize a damages remedy under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics for his First and Fifth Amendment claims. Cheng conceded that those claims arose in new contexts, meaning they were not among the three types of constitutional damages claims previously recognized by the Supreme Court under Bivens.
The court therefore considered whether special factors counseled against creating a new remedy. It concluded that they did. The court cited concerns about burdening the executive branch and increasing litigation against Bureau of Prisons officials. It also found that Congress had created alternative avenues for relief, including the prison grievance process and the Federal Tort Claims Act. The court concluded that Cheng had not stated a claim under Bivens and dismissed his claims against Grenier in his individual capacity.
Federal Tort Claims Act Claims
Cheng brought negligence and misrepresentation claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. That Act waives the United States’ immunity in limited circumstances for injuries caused by negligent or wrongful acts of federal employees acting within the scope of employment. It does not permit claims arising out of misrepresentation.
The court ruled that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the misrepresentation claim because that type of claim is excluded from the Act. The court also ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the negligence claim because Cheng had not completed the Act’s administrative-exhaustion requirement before filing suit. Cheng filed the lawsuit on March 1, 2023, but did not file his tort grievance with FCI Sandstone until May 8, 2023. Although the grievance was later treated as denied after the agency failed to act for six months, Cheng had filed the lawsuit prematurely.
Disposition
The court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. It ordered that Cheng’s claims one, two, and three be dismissed with prejudice and that claims four and five be dismissed without prejudice. The opinion does not expressly identify the claim numbers in the final order by subject matter, but its analysis addresses the three constitutional claims first and the two tort claims second.
Read the full 12-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.