White v. City of Minneapolis

Background

Kacey White and Charles Stotts owned the Town Talk Diner & Gastropub in Minneapolis. They alleged that the City of Minneapolis and Mayor Jacob Frey failed to respond adequately to unrest after the May 25, 2020 murder of George Floyd. They claimed that the defendants failed to deploy and instruct law-enforcement personnel adequately, did not request or provide necessary reinforcements, withdrew officers from the Third Precinct, and failed to provide sufficient police and fire protection. Town Talk was set on fire at about 3:30 a.m. on May 29, 2020, and burned to the ground by 8:19 a.m.

The plaintiffs’ complaint asserted five claims: (1) procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, based on the alleged failure to quell the unrest and provide notice and a hearing; (2) substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, based on the alleged failure to protect their property; (3) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, which concerns neglecting to prevent certain conspiratorial wrongs; (4) a takings claim under the Minnesota Constitution; and (5) a claim under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act involving a public-records request. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings on the first four claims.

Legal standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is decided under the same standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences for the plaintiffs, but legal conclusions presented as facts may be disregarded. The complaint must allege enough facts to make relief plausible rather than merely possible.

Procedural-due-process claim

The court held that the plaintiffs could not maintain their procedural-due-process claim. To state such a claim, a plaintiff must identify a protected property or liberty interest and then show that the government failed to provide the process required for that interest.

The court considered two possible interests: ownership of Town Talk and an interest in having the government protect the property. As to ownership, the court held that the alleged injury—the loss of access, use, and enjoyment of the property—was caused by independent third-party agitators, not by the defendants. The plaintiffs therefore did not adequately connect their injury to the defendants’ conduct and lacked standing for that theory. As to government protection, the court held that citizens do not have a constitutionally protected property interest in receiving government services or protection from harm caused by private actors. The court granted the motion as to the procedural-due-process claim.

Substantive-due-process claim

The plaintiffs alleged a fundamental right to police and fire protection and a right to protection from dangers created by the government. The court declined to recognize a fundamental constitutional right to municipal police and fire protection.

The court also rejected the state-created-danger theory. That theory can apply when government action creates a danger that would not otherwise exist, but the plaintiffs had to allege, among other things, that they belonged to a limited and precisely definable group and that the municipality’s conduct shocked the conscience. The court concluded that the alleged group—residents and business owners in the Third Precinct, or members of the public in Minneapolis—was essentially the general public. The court also held that the allegations did not show conscience-shocking conduct because the defendants were responding to a volatile situation without sufficient time to deliberate, and the plaintiffs did not allege that the defendants intended to cause the destruction. The court granted the motion as to the substantive-due-process claim.

42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim

The court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. A § 1986 claim must be based on a valid conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The plaintiffs did not allege that they belonged to a protected class subject to invidious discrimination, which was required for the potentially applicable § 1985 categories. Because they did not adequately allege a § 1985 conspiracy, they also did not adequately allege a § 1986 violation. The court granted the motion as to this claim.

Minnesota takings claim

The court held that the plaintiffs’ Minnesota constitutional takings claim was not properly before it. Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal law, not state constitutional rights. Minnesota law provides an inverse-condemnation process for seeking compensation for a taking, and a state-law takings claim under the Minnesota Constitution may not be pursued until the plaintiff has first filed a mandamus action in state court. The court granted the motion as to this claim.

Remaining state-law claim and disposition

After ruling on the first four claims, only the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act claim remained. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning jurisdiction over the state claim connected to the federal claims, because all claims within the court’s original federal jurisdiction had been dismissed and the remaining claim depended solely on state law.

The court ordered that the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings was GRANTED, that the plaintiffs’ federal-law claims—Counts One, Two, Three, and Four—were DISMISSED, and that the case was REMANDED to Hennepin County District Court, Fourth Judicial District. The opinion does not state that the federal claims were dismissed with or without prejudice.