McNeally v. HomeTown Bank

Background

Tara C. McNeally worked for HomeTown Bank at a branch located inside Shakopee High School. The Bank, not the school district, paid and supervised her. Her duties included managing student interns, teaching financial literacy, speaking in classes, and serving as a bank teller. She also had an overarching responsibility to represent the Bank positively within the schools.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, McNeally publicly opposed the District’s masking policies. She confronted School Board Chair Kristi Peterson about masking, attended a school event without a required mask, displayed a sign stating “MASKS = NO LEVY” at a School Board meeting, and posted a critical comment about Peterson on Facebook. She later told a news outlet that Peterson had contacted the Bank to demand removal of the Facebook post. The opinion states that Peterson had not contacted the Bank and that the statement was untrue.

Superintendent Michael Redmond discussed McNeally’s conduct with Bank branch manager Lindsey Puffer. Redmond asked Puffer to address the Facebook post as she saw fit and later sent a letter requesting that McNeally not enter school property in her capacity as an employee involved in the school-and-bank partnership while the Bank investigated. The Bank suspended McNeally, conducted its own investigation, and terminated her after finding violations of its conduct standards and social-media guidelines, inability to perform certain duties because of the school-property ban, and improper use of work time.

Claims and summary-judgment standard

McNeally asserted First Amendment retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants. Section 1983 allows claims for constitutional violations committed by government actors and, in some circumstances, private parties who jointly act with government actors. She also asserted a Minnesota tortious-interference claim against Redmond based on her employment agreement with the Bank.

The court applied the summary-judgment standard. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

HomeTown Bank and Lindsey Puffer

The court granted the Bank Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Because HomeTown Bank and Puffer are private defendants, McNeally had to provide evidence that they jointly acted with a state actor to deprive her of a constitutional right. The court found no evidence of an agreement or shared unconstitutional goal between the Bank Defendants and Redmond. It also found no evidence that anyone from the District asked or pressured the Bank to suspend, terminate, or otherwise discipline McNeally.

The court concluded that the Bank made the suspension and termination decisions after its independent investigation and based on concerns extending beyond McNeally’s work at the District. Therefore, McNeally’s § 1983 claim against the Bank Defendants failed.

Michael Redmond

The court granted Redmond’s motion for summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim. It held that McNeally’s “MASKS = NO LEVY” sign and Facebook post were protected speech because she spoke as a citizen on matters of public concern.

The court nevertheless found that McNeally had not shown an actionable adverse action. Redmond’s statements to McNeally, even accepting her account, were not by themselves sufficiently adverse. The court also found no evidence that Redmond caused the Bank’s suspension or termination decisions. Redmond’s temporary restriction applied only to McNeally’s work-related presence on school property, did not prevent her from attending School Board meetings or voting, and did not materially change her working conditions because the Bank had suspended her from all of its locations at the same time.

The court further held that McNeally did not show that her protected speech was the necessary cause of Redmond’s restriction. It found that Redmond reasonably acted in response to what he viewed as escalating and erratic conduct involving students, school events, and a false report to the media, and that the restriction would have occurred regardless of the Facebook post’s content. The court also concluded under the Pickering balancing framework—which weighs a speaker’s interests against the government’s interest in efficient public services—that Redmond’s interests in preventing disruption and protecting students and staff prevailed.

The court additionally held that Redmond was entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity generally protects government officials from liability unless their conduct violated a clearly established right. The court found no clearly established law prohibiting a superintendent from temporarily restricting a private employee working on school grounds from entering the school in that employee capacity during an investigation.

Kristi Peterson

The court granted Peterson’s motion for summary judgment. Under § 1983, an individual defendant must have been personally involved in causing the constitutional violation. The court found no evidence that Peterson took an adverse action against McNeally, directed the Bank or Redmond to act against her, or caused the suspension, termination, or school-property restriction. The court also held that Peterson was entitled to qualified immunity.

Shakopee Public Schools and School Board

The court granted the School Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. A school district or school board cannot be held liable under § 1983 merely because an employee or agent allegedly caused an injury. McNeally had to show that an official policy, widespread custom, or practice caused the alleged constitutional violation.

The court found no such policy, custom, or practice. It found no evidence that others who criticized the District’s masking policy were restricted from District property or otherwise punished because of their speech. The School Board also had no part in Redmond’s letter or the Bank’s investigation, suspension, or termination of McNeally.

Tortious interference claim against Redmond

The court granted Redmond’s motion for summary judgment on the tortious-interference claim. To prove that claim, McNeally had to show, among other things, that Redmond intentionally caused the Bank to breach her employment agreement. The court found that the Bank acted after its own independent investigation and that no evidence showed Redmond intended to procure McNeally’s suspension or termination.

Disposition

The court ordered that Redmond’s motion for summary judgment was granted; HomeTown Bank and Puffer’s motion for summary judgment was granted; McNeally’s partial motion for summary judgment was denied; and the School Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted. The court dismissed McNeally’s complaint with prejudice in its entirety and directed that judgment be entered.