Vargas v. Lopez

Background

The court issued a tentative order addressing proposed preliminary and final jury instructions submitted by the parties. The parties were directed to be prepared to discuss objections, comments, and suggestions at the October 2, 2025, pretrial conference. The court explained that preliminary instructions would be given after the jury was sworn and before opening statements, while final instructions would be finalized after the evidence closed and discussed at a charging conference.

The instructions describe three claims by Ernesto Vargas: (1) an Eighth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Lopez-Ortega for deliberate indifference to Vargas’s safety; (2) a California common-law negligence claim against Lopez-Ortega; and (3) a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Lieutenant Whitman. The court stated that the action is against Whitman and Lopez-Ortega, who are described as California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation correctional officers working at the Correctional Training Facility. It is not an action against California, the department, or a department prison.

Tentative rulings on preliminary instructions

The court generally preferred Vargas’s version of one disputed instruction but removed language about qualified immunity and the defendants’ burden of proof on that defense. The court explained that qualified immunity is for the court, not the jury, to resolve. It otherwise adopted or modified several stipulated instructions, including instructions concerning evidence, outside information, note-taking, and deposition testimony.

The court rejected a proposed habit-or-routine-practice instruction from both sides because the proposed versions summarized evidentiary rules that the court uses to decide admissibility rather than instructions intended for the jury. It also rejected Vargas’s proposed deposition instruction and instead adopted a modified model instruction addressing when jurors may hear deposition testimony in place of live testimony. The court used the defendants’ proposed instruction concerning Vargas’s 2003 conviction because Vargas indicated that he intended to provide at least some testimony about that conviction.

Tentative rulings on final instructions

For the § 1983 claims, the court instructed that Vargas must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant acted under color of state law, deprived him of a constitutional right, and actually caused the claimed injury. The parties stipulated that the defendants acted under color of state law. The proposed instructions state that a verdict should be for Vargas on a claim if he proves these elements and the elements specific to the Eighth or First Amendment claim; otherwise, the verdict should be for the defendant.

For the Eighth Amendment claim, the proposed instruction requires Vargas to prove that Lopez-Ortega intentionally decided the conditions under which Vargas was confined; those conditions created a substantial risk of serious harm; Lopez-Ortega failed to take reasonable available measures to reduce that risk even though a reasonable officer would have appreciated the high degree of risk; and that failure caused Vargas’s injuries. The instruction further states that Lopez-Ortega must have acted objectively unreasonably and must have known facts from which he inferred that a substantial risk of serious harm existed.

The court did not decide in advance whether to give a security-policy deference instruction. It stated that the issue would be evaluated after the evidence closed and discussed with the parties at the charging conference.

For the First Amendment retaliation claim, the proposed instruction concerns Vargas’s allegation that Whitman retaliated against him for filing a prison grievance by denying his appeal of a rule-violation report. The instruction requires proof that Vargas engaged in protected conduct, Whitman took adverse action, Whitman acted because of the protected conduct, the action chilled Vargas’s exercise of First Amendment rights, and the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Vargas must also show that his protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor behind Whitman’s conduct. The court stated that the timing of events may be considered as circumstantial evidence of causation.

For the negligence claim, the court included an instruction that Lopez-Ortega had a duty to protect Vargas from foreseeable harm inflicted by a third party. The court relied on California law recognizing a special relationship between a jailer and prisoner that creates a duty of care. It also used the usual reasonable-person standard of care, concluding that Vargas had not shown that a different standard applied. The court rejected proposed instructions on joint and several liability and comparative fault.

Damages and further filing

The court adopted instructions stating that, if the jury finds for Vargas on any of the three claims, it must determine damages and Vargas must prove them by a preponderance of the evidence. The listed considerations include the nature and extent of injuries, loss of enjoyment of life, and mental, physical, or emotional pain and suffering. The award must be based on evidence rather than speculation.

The court stated that nominal damages may be awarded on the First Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims if Vargas proves the claim but not actual damages, with nominal damages not exceeding one dollar. Nominal damages may not be awarded on the negligence claim when Vargas has not proved damages. The court also retained an instruction concerning punitive damages, modified for the state-law claims, and made other changes to verdict-form and jury-administration instructions.

Judge Thomas S. Hixson ordered the parties to file a joint statement no later than October 9, 2025, stating their views on which preliminary instructions should be repeated in the final instructions. This was a tentative jury-instruction order; it did not resolve liability, damages, or the merits of Vargas’s claims.