Johnson v. Linebarger, Goggan, Blair & Sampson, LLP

Background

Robert W. Johnson, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Linebarger, Goggan, Blair & Sampson LLP after receiving a July 16, 2019 notice concerning unpaid tolls and fees allegedly owed to the New York State Thruway Authority. The notice stated that an earlier notice had been sent, that Johnson had not responded, and that his driver’s license and vehicle registration could be suspended if he did not respond. Johnson alleged that Linebarger wrongly assumed the debt was valid, lacked authority to collect it because the firm was based in Texas, denied him due process, and provided ineffective counsel.

The case was initially filed in the Western District of Texas and was transferred to the Southern District of New York. Johnson also named the New York State Thruway Authority and Cristina Gonzalez, but the opinion states that he alleged no facts concerning those defendants. The court added them as defendants and addressed their claims under the same reasoning applied to Linebarger.

Constitutional claims

The court construed Johnson’s constitutional allegations as claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a remedy for violations of federal rights by people acting under state authority. Linebarger was not a government entity. The court assumed, without deciding, that Linebarger’s work as a debt collector for the New York State Thruway Authority could make it subject to § 1983, but held that Johnson still failed to state a constitutional claim.

For procedural due process, a plaintiff must have a protected liberty or property interest and must show that the process provided before deprivation was inadequate. The court stated that Johnson may have had a protectable interest in the money Linebarger sought to collect. But it held that the notice reasonably informed him about the tolls and fees and provided contact information for the New York State Thruway Authority and Linebarger. Because the notice gave him an opportunity to object, the court concluded that he was not deprived of property without notice or an opportunity to be heard.

The court also dismissed Johnson’s ineffective-assistance allegation because Linebarger was not representing him and therefore could not have provided him ineffective counsel.

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

The court considered whether Johnson’s allegations could state a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, a federal law regulating deceptive or abusive practices by debt collectors. The court stated that Linebarger likely qualified as a debt collector, but held that Johnson did not identify conduct violating the statute. It also held that highway tolls and fees were not consumer debt under the statute because they were not obligations primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

State-law claims and amendment

The court dismissed the federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning authority over related state-law claims, so any remaining state-law claims were not considered. The court also declined to give Johnson permission to amend because it found that the defects in the complaint could not be cured by amendment.

Disposition

The court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), terminated all other pending matters, and certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. It therefore denied permission to appeal without prepaying fees. The opinion’s citation to the specific subparagraph in the conclusion appears garbled, but the order clearly states that the complaint was dismissed.