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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Dec. 4, 2019

Ortiz v. Berryhill

Judge
James Cott
Docket
1:18-cv-04516
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
6
Social SecurityCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Ortiz v. Saul, Judge Cott granted the Commissioner’s motion and removed a 120-day remand deadline and automatic-benefits directive.

Who this affects

Jose Ortiz and the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration were affected. The order removed the deadline and automatic-benefits directive governing the agency’s further proceedings in Ortiz’s case.

What happened

In Ortiz v. Saul, the court had previously sent Jose Ortiz’s Social Security case back to the agency for more proceedings, set a 120-day deadline, and directed benefits to be calculated if the deadline was missed. The Commissioner asked the court to change that judgment, and Ortiz opposed the motion.

The Commissioner argued that Second Circuit precedent, the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause, and protection from lawsuits against the government barred paying benefits merely because the deadline passed. The court focused on whether Ortiz had already shown that he was disabled. It concluded that he had not: the record showed a severe impairment, but did not establish disability through the later steps of the agency’s evaluation.

Judge James L. Cott granted the Commissioner’s motion. The court vacated the earlier order only to the extent it imposed the 120-day deadline and required immediate calculation of benefits if the deadline was exceeded. The court did not decide the Appropriations Clause or government-immunity arguments.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Ortiz v. Berryhill · No. 1:18-cv-04516
Judge
James Cott
Date
Dec. 4, 2019

Background

In an earlier opinion, the Court remanded Jose Ortiz’s Social Security benefits case to the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration for further administrative proceedings. The Court had also imposed a 120-day deadline for those proceedings and directed that benefits be paid if the deadline was not met. Judgment was entered on September 26, 2019.

The Commissioner moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment. The Commissioner argued that the Court had erred by imposing the deadline and by ordering benefits based solely on the passage of time. Ortiz filed an opposition.

Court’s analysis

The Court considered the Second Circuit’s decisions in Bush v. Shalala and Butts v. Barnhart. Bush held that delay alone is not enough to justify remanding a Social Security case for payment of benefits when the claimant has not been found actually disabled. Butts recognized that a court may impose enforceable time limits in some cases reviewed at the fifth step of the Social Security disability evaluation, where the claimant is presumptively disabled and the Commissioner must show that jobs exist that the claimant can perform.

The Court concluded that Butts did not apply here. Although Ortiz’s application had been denied at step five, the Court had remanded because the record was not fully developed concerning his residual functional capacity. The record established that Ortiz had a severe impairment at step two, but it did not establish disability through a listed impairment at step three or through past relevant work at step four. Because the administrative decision did not compel a finding of disability, Ortiz was not yet presumptively entitled to benefits. Reaching step five alone was therefore insufficient to justify a deadline backed by an order to calculate benefits.

The Court stated that it had erred in imposing the time limit and the potential benefits payment based on the passage of time. Because it resolved the motion on the basis of Butts and related decisions, it did not reach the Commissioner’s arguments concerning the Appropriations Clause or sovereign immunity.

Disposition

Judge James L. Cott granted the Commissioner’s Rule 59(e) motion. The Court vacated its prior opinion and order to the extent that it imposed a time limit on the remand proceedings and directed immediate calculation of benefits if the deadline was exceeded. The Clerk was directed to close Docket No. 30 and mark it as granted.

The authoritative version

Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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