Davila v. United States
- Colleen McMahon
- 1:16-cv-04968
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 4
In Davila v. United States, Judge McMahon denied Davila’s post-conviction motion, ruling Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a violent crime under federal firearm law.
Luis Davila’s federal firearm conviction and sentence were left undisturbed; the United States prevailed on the motion.
What happened
In Davila v. United States, Luis Davila pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act robbery and to using and carrying a firearm during that robbery. The court sentenced him to time served on the robbery count and 60 months in prison on the firearm count.
Davila asked the court to vacate the firearm conviction, arguing that Hobbs Act robbery no longer qualified as a violent crime after Supreme Court decisions invalidated part of the firearm statute’s definition. The court explained that Hobbs Act robbery meets the statute’s separate force-based definition because it requires actual or threatened force, violence, or fear of injury.
Chief Judge Colleen McMahon denied Davila’s motion. The court also said it would not issue permission to appeal and found that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
The detailed version
- Davila v. United States · No. 1:16-cv-04968
- Colleen McMahon
- Dec. 4, 2019
Background
Luis Davila pleaded guilty on April 30, 2012, to two counts in an information. Count One charged Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Count Two charged using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to that robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). During the plea proceeding, Davila admitted that he entered a grocery store with a firearm, brandished it, and demanded money.
On November 20, 2012, the court sentenced Davila to time served on Count One and 60 months’ imprisonment on Count Two.
Davila’s motion
On June 24, 2016, Davila filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which allows a federal prisoner to challenge a sentence or conviction in certain circumstances. He argued that his firearm conviction should be vacated because Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c) after the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Johnson and Welch v. United States.
The court initially held the motion while related appellate decisions were pending. After the Supreme Court decided United States v. Davis in 2019, the court ordered an updated government response. Davis held that § 924(c)(3)(B), the statute’s “risk-of-force clause,” was unconstitutionally vague.
Court’s analysis
Section 924(c) imposes a separate firearm offense when a defendant uses or carries a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of violence” or possesses one in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The statute defines a crime of violence in two ways: under the “force clause,” the felony must include as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against a person or property; under the risk-of-force clause, the felony must by its nature involve a substantial risk that physical force may be used.
The court explained that Davis invalidated the risk-of-force clause but did not call the force clause into question. It relied on the Second Circuit’s decision in Hill, which held that Hobbs Act robbery satisfies the force clause. Under the categorical approach, courts examine the elements of the offense rather than the particular facts of the defendant’s conduct. The Hobbs Act robbery statute requires robbery by means of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear of injury. The court therefore concluded that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under § 924(c).
Ruling
Chief Judge Colleen McMahon denied Davila’s § 2255 motion. The court found that Davila had not made a substantial showing that a constitutional right had been denied, so it would not issue a certification of appealability. The court also found under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from the order would not be taken in good faith.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.