Angulo-Aguirre v. United States
- Colleen McMahon
- 7:16-cv-04523
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 5
In Angulo-Aguirre v. United States, Judge McMahon denied Angulo-Aguirre’s sentence challenge, finding his firearm conviction was legally supported.
The ruling affected Plutarco Angulo-Aguirre’s federal sentence and firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
What happened
In Angulo-Aguirre v. United States, Plutarco Angulo-Aguirre challenged his firearm conviction, arguing that the law’s definition of a qualifying violent crime was unconstitutional. He relied on Supreme Court decisions finding a similar risk-based definition too vague.
The court rejected the challenge because Hobbs Act robbery requires actual or threatened force, which qualifies as a violent crime under the separate force-based part of the firearm statute. The court concluded that the Supreme Court’s later decision did not invalidate that force-based definition.
Chief Judge Colleen McMahon denied the motion. She also refused to issue a certificate allowing an appeal and found that any appeal would not be taken in good faith.
The detailed version
- Angulo-Aguirre v. United States · No. 7:16-cv-04523
- Colleen McMahon
- Dec. 10, 2019
Background
Plutarco Angulo-Aguirre pleaded guilty in 2008 to five counts involving kidnapping, conspiracy, robbery, and brandishing a firearm in connection with a crime of violence. In 2009, the court sentenced him to 294 months in prison, including a consecutive 84-month sentence on the firearm count under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The opinion states that he was serving that sentence in federal prison and had a projected release date of May 2027.
In 2016, the Office of the Federal Public Defender filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which allows a federal prisoner to challenge a sentence in limited circumstances. The court initially held the motion for later consideration. Angulo-Aguirre then filed a supplemental memorandum arguing that none of the convictions underlying his firearm conviction qualified as a crime of violence because § 924(c)’s residual, or risk-of-force, clause was unconstitutionally vague. Counsel later filed an additional memorandum. The government opposed the motion, and counsel for Angulo-Aguirre filed a reply.
Legal issue
Section 924(c) makes it a crime to use or carry a firearm during and in relation to, or possess a firearm in furtherance of, a crime of violence. The statute defines a crime of violence in two relevant ways: under the force clause, the offense must include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force; under the residual clause, the offense must involve a substantial risk that physical force may be used.
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Davis that § 924(c)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. The issue here was whether Angulo-Aguirre’s firearm conviction could still stand because one of the predicate offenses—Hobbs Act robbery—qualified under the force clause.
Court’s reasoning
The court explained that Davis invalidated the residual clause, not the force clause. It relied on the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hill, which held that Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s force clause. Hobbs Act robbery requires the use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear of injury, and therefore has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against a person or property.
The court concluded that Davis did not undermine Hill. Because Hobbs Act robbery qualified under the force clause, it properly supported Angulo-Aguirre’s § 924(c) conviction. The court therefore found his Johnson/Davis challenge without merit.
Ruling
The court denied the motion. It also determined that Angulo-Aguirre had not made the required substantial showing that a constitutional right had been denied, so it would not issue a certificate of appealability. The court further found under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from the order would not be taken in good faith. Chief Judge Colleen McMahon signed the decision and order on December 10, 2019.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.