Sullivan, Jr. v. Ringling College of Art And Design, Inc.

Background

Phillip Sullivan, Jr., who is deaf and lives in New York, sued Ringling College of Art and Design, Inc. He alleged that, in January 2019, he tried to watch a video on the “Campus Life” page of Ringling’s website, but the video lacked closed captioning and was not independently usable by deaf and hard-of-hearing people. He asserted claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act and under state and municipal law.

Ringling is a not-for-profit corporation established under Florida law, with its principal place of business in Florida. The opinion states that Ringling did not own property or have an office, employee, bank account, or telephone listing in New York, was not licensed to conduct business there, and had no New York service agent. Ringling operated a nationwide website that it described as informational. The website did not sell goods or services and did not offer online courses. Ringling also acknowledged limited student-recruiting and alumni activities in New York.

Motion and Legal Standard

Ringling moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, meaning that it argued the court lacked legal authority over Ringling. Sullivan argued that Ringling’s website established jurisdiction under sections 302(a)(1) and 302(a)(3) of New York’s long-arm statute.

The court explained that it first had to determine whether New York’s long-arm statute authorized jurisdiction and, if so, whether exercising jurisdiction would comply with constitutional due-process requirements. Because there had been no evidentiary hearing, Sullivan needed to make a preliminary showing based on legally sufficient allegations. The court considered the complaint and an affidavit submitted by Ringling, but not additional factual allegations raised for the first time in Sullivan’s opposition brief.

Section 302(a)(1)

Section 302(a)(1) allows jurisdiction when a defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that business activity. The court held that Ringling’s website did not establish jurisdiction. The website was primarily informational, did not conduct traditional online business, and was available throughout the United States. Its availability to New York residents, without more, did not show that Ringling purposefully targeted New York.

The court also held that Sullivan’s allegations did not show that New York residents specifically used the website or that Ringling specifically directed it at New Yorkers. Ringling’s recruiting and alumni events and other advertising in New York did not establish the required purposeful business activity. In addition, Sullivan did not allege that he attended one of those events or was interested in attending Ringling, so his claim did not have the required substantial relationship to those activities.

Section 302(a)(3)

Section 302(a)(3) concerns an out-of-state tort that causes injury in New York and requires additional New York-related activity or a reasonably expected effect in New York. The court noted uncertainty about whether Sullivan had alleged an out-of-state act because his complaint stated that he viewed the website in New York and that substantial parts of the alleged conduct occurred there.

Even assuming the alleged act occurred outside New York, the court held that section 302(a)(3) did not provide jurisdiction. The nationwide informational website did not establish regular or persistent business activity in New York, and the complaint did not allege a purposeful New York connection. The court also held that Sullivan had not adequately alleged that Ringling expected or should reasonably have expected the alleged conduct to have consequences in New York. Ringling’s nationwide recruiting and alumni activities were not enough.

Because New York’s long-arm statute did not confer jurisdiction, the court did not reach the separate question of whether jurisdiction would satisfy constitutional due process.

Jurisdictional Discovery and Disposition

Sullivan asked for discovery about jurisdictional facts that he said were within Ringling’s possession. The court denied that request. It held that Sullivan had not made the required preliminary showing that there was a basis for jurisdiction or shown that additional facts could subject Ringling to New York jurisdiction. The court also noted that Sullivan had chosen to rely on the complaint rather than submit affidavits or exhibits with his opposition.

The court granted Ringling’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, denied Sullivan’s request for jurisdictional discovery, directed the Clerk to terminate the motion, and closed the case. The opinion did not decide the merits of Sullivan’s disability-access claims.