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S.D.N.Y.Substantive rulingFiled Dec. 5, 2019

Jamison v. Cavada

Judge
Alvin Hellerstein
Docket
1:17-cv-01764
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
14
Civil RightsSection 1983Summary JudgmentFourth Amendment
In one sentence

In Jamison v. Cavada, Judge Swain granted summary judgment in part and denied it in part, leaving some civil-rights claims unresolved.

Who this affects

D’Anthony Jamison’s claims against Detective Nathan Cavada. The ruling ended some claims at summary judgment while allowing the April 1 false-arrest and fair-trial claims and the head-injury excessive-force claim to continue.

What happened

In Jamison v. Cavada, D’Anthony Jamison alleged that Detective Nathan Cavada unlawfully arrested him, used excessive force, maliciously prosecuted him, and denied him a fair trial. The dispute concerned two arrests in April 2014 and charges that were later dismissed on speedy-trial grounds.

The court granted summary judgment on Jamison’s claims concerning the April 4 arrest, malicious prosecution, the April 4 fair-trial claim, and excessive force based on tight handcuffing. It denied summary judgment on the April 1 false-arrest claim, the April 1 fair-trial claim, and the excessive-force claim based on Cavada allegedly striking Jamison’s head against a railing.

Judge Laura Taylor Swain ruled that factual disputes required a factfinder to resolve the April 1 arrest, alleged fabricated evidence, and head-injury claims, while Jamison’s conclusory evidence could not support the dismissed claims.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Jamison v. Cavada · No. 1:17-cv-01764
Judge
Alvin Hellerstein
Date
Dec. 5, 2019

Background

D’Anthony Jamison brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Detective Nathan Cavada, alleging unlawful detention and arrest, malicious prosecution, denial of a fair trial, and excessive force. Cavada moved for summary judgment on all claims. Summary judgment is a decision without a trial entered when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to win under the law.

On April 1, 2014, Cavada followed Jamison onto a Brooklyn-bound subway train and asked him to leave so Cavada could issue a ticket for allegedly holding the train doors open. Jamison said he began walking away because he had done nothing unlawful, and that Cavada then grabbed his neck and smashed his head against a railing before tightly handcuffing him. Cavada’s account differed about what Jamison had done on the platform and train. After a warrant check, Cavada arrested Jamison and later charged him with interfering with transit service and possessing stolen property based on an allegedly stolen iPhone.

On April 4, 2014, Cavada arrested Jamison again after investigating Jamison’s MetroCard. Cavada said the card had been purchased with a stolen credit card and that a search incident to the arrest found a pipe that tested positive for cocaine. Jamison denied possessing stolen property or a controlled substance. The charges from both arrests were dismissed on February 18, 2015, under speedy-trial provisions.

Rulings

April 1 false arrest. The court denied summary judgment. Jamison and Cavada gave materially different accounts of what happened before the arrest. Taking Jamison’s account as true at this stage, a reasonable jury could find that Cavada forcibly seized him before discovering the outstanding warrants or allegedly stolen iPhone and therefore lacked probable cause. The same disputes prevented the court from deciding qualified immunity as a matter of law. Qualified immunity can protect an officer from money damages when the officer did not violate a clearly established right; an officer may also receive that protection when it was objectively reasonable to believe probable cause existed. The court found that factual disputes prevented resolution of that defense on summary judgment.

April 4 false arrest. The court granted summary judgment to Cavada. Jamison did not genuinely dispute that his MetroCard had been purchased with a stolen credit card, and his statement that he did not possess a controlled substance did not dispute Cavada’s evidence that the pipe found in his possession tested positive for cocaine. The court therefore concluded that Cavada had probable cause for the April 4 arrest.

Malicious prosecution. The court granted summary judgment to Cavada. A claim of malicious prosecution requires, among other things, that the criminal proceeding ended in a way indicating the accused’s innocence. The court ruled that dismissal of Jamison’s charges on speedy-trial grounds did not affirmatively indicate his innocence, so Jamison could not establish this required element.

Fair trial. The court denied summary judgment on the claim arising from the April 1 charges. If Jamison’s statements were accepted, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Cavada fabricated the account that Jamison held the subway doors open and possessed a stolen iPhone, and that the charges were based on that alleged fabrication. The court granted summary judgment on the April 4 fair-trial claim because Jamison offered only a conclusory denial and no factual evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the controlled-substance charge was based on fabricated evidence.

Excessive force. The court denied summary judgment on the claim that Cavada smashed Jamison’s head against a railing. Viewing the evidence in Jamison’s favor, a reasonable jury could find that the force was objectively unreasonable because Jamison was not fleeing and was suspected of a minor crime. The court granted summary judgment on the handcuffing claim because Jamison did not provide evidence of a continuing wrist injury beyond temporary discomfort.

Disposition

The court granted Cavada’s motion for summary judgment as to the April 4 false-arrest claim, the malicious-prosecution claim, the April 4 fair-trial claim, and the handcuffing excessive-force claim. The court denied the motion in all other respects, leaving the April 1 false-arrest claim, the April 1 fair-trial claim, and the head-injury excessive-force claim unresolved. The court directed the parties to schedule a settlement conference and stated that the case remained referred for general pretrial management.

The authoritative version

Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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