Franza v. Stanford

Background

Dominic M. Franza, a person representing himself, sued New York State Board of Parole officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and the rule from United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy. Franza sought damages and declaratory relief.

Franza was serving a 25-to-50-year New York State prison sentence after convictions for three counts of attempted murder in the second degree and one count of possession of a dangerous weapon in the first degree. Before his November 14, 2017 parole interview, a risk-and-needs assessment rated his risks low or unlikely in the listed categories. The panel denied parole, citing the nature of his crimes, his disciplinary record, the likelihood that he would violate the law if released, and public safety. Franza alleged that the panel did not identify which assessment scale it had departed from or provide a sufficiently individualized explanation.

After an administrative appeal, Franza received a new interview. At the April 17, 2018 interview, the panel again acknowledged low risk scores but denied parole based in part on his alleged lack of insight into the circumstances of his crimes and his relationships with women and family members. Franza again alleged that the panel did not identify the assessment scale from which it departed or give a sufficiently individualized reason. The Appeals Unit later affirmed the denial and identified several reasons for the departure, including lack of insight, concerns about his ability to live honestly, his need to build family and agency contacts, sentencing materials, and his need to gain insight. Franza alleged that the appeal decision was improperly approved and that part of its written explanation mistakenly referred to another inmate’s record. An amended appeal decision removed that section. Franza alleged that his April 17, 2019 parole decision complied with the state rule because it identified the assessment scale from which the panel departed.

Motion to dismiss

The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. The court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion and interpreted Franza’s self-represented filings liberally, but explained that this did not excuse compliance with substantive and procedural law.

Absolute immunity

The court held that Tina M. Stanford, Erik Berliner, Charles Davis, Tyece Drake, Caryne Demosthenes, and Marc Coppola were absolutely immune from Franza’s claims for damages. Absolute immunity protects officials from damages suits for certain functions closely resembling judicial decision-making. The court found that the alleged conduct—participating in parole hearings, deciding whether to deny parole, and reviewing or approving an administrative appeal—occurred while the officials performed quasi-adjudicative functions. The court rejected Franza’s argument that alleged failure to follow the state parole regulations made those activities non-discretionary and therefore unprotected.

The court noted that Kiley was the Parole Board’s chief counsel rather than a commissioner and did not decide whether she also had absolute immunity. It stated that this issue did not need to be reached because qualified immunity independently protected her.

Qualified immunity

Qualified immunity generally protects government officials from damages liability unless their conduct violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right. The court held that Franza did not allege specific conduct by Kiley. His allegations that Kiley failed to ensure that other defendants complied with federal and state law were conclusory and did not state a claim.

The court also held that Franza had not identified precedent clearly establishing that failing to follow state regulations when explaining parole decisions violated the Fourteenth Amendment, or that Kiley’s alleged failure to ensure compliance violated clearly established law. The court stated that the absence of clearly established law also supplied an alternative basis for dismissing the claims against the other defendants.

Declaratory relief

The court explained that immunity does not necessarily bar prospective declaratory relief, but that Franza sought only a declaration about alleged violations during the November 2017 and April 2018 hearings. Those were completed events, and Franza did not allege an ongoing violation or ongoing harm. Because the requested declaration would merely recognize an alleged past wrong, the court held that declaratory relief was improper.

Disposition

Judge Kenneth M. Karas granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Because the dismissal rested on the legal conclusions that the defendants were immune and that the asserted right was not clearly established, the court found that amendment would be futile. Franza had already amended his complaint twice, so the court dismissed the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice, directed the Clerk to terminate the motion, and closed the case.