Megginson v. Molina

Background

The court held a telephone conference on November 20, 2019, and set a schedule for the defendants’ anticipated motion for summary judgment. It also mailed Michael Megginson excerpts from the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York’s local rules concerning summary-judgment motions, noting that he should also consult Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and other resources.

Megginson, who was incarcerated and proceeding without a lawyer, later filed a letter that the court treated as an application in this case. He moved for summary judgment against the defendants, asked the court to compel production of records and other information, filed a letter opposing a defense summary-judgment motion that had not yet been filed, and asked when counsel would be assigned.

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment may be granted when there is no genuine dispute about an important fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court must view factual uncertainties and reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Although the court interpreted Megginson’s filings liberally because he was representing himself, that did not excuse compliance with procedural and substantive rules.

The court denied Megginson’s motion for summary judgment. His motion was only three sentences long, with two sentences addressing summary judgment: “The deffendant [sic] Roberta Molina cause me injury” and “The video shows her spraying multiable [sic] times.” The court found that these statements did not establish either that no important facts were disputed or that Megginson was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The court also held that, even assuming the facts asserted by Megginson were undisputed, evidence that Molina sprayed him with a whole can of OC gas did not by itself establish that her conduct was unreasonable. Excessive-force claims arising from an arrest are evaluated under the Fourth Amendment’s objective-reasonableness standard, which considers the facts and circumstances confronting the officer. The court concluded that the record did not contain enough facts to evaluate whether Molina’s conduct was reasonable.

Megginson’s letter opposing the defendants’ anticipated summary-judgment motion was premature because that motion had not yet been filed. The court therefore did not consider the letter. The order reminded the parties that the defendants’ motion was due December 18, 2019, and Megginson’s opposition was due January 29, 2020.

Motion to Compel Production

The court treated part of Megginson’s filing as a request to compel production of a photocopy of the OC gas canister and information about how many bursts of gas the officer used. Megginson said he had requested the information during discovery but had not received it. At the November 20 conference, the defendants agreed to search for the information but could not confirm whether any physical evidence still existed. The defendants later said they had mailed Megginson a courtesy copy of the complete Use of Force Investigation and related reports on November 25, 2019.

Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 generally requires a motion to compel to include a certification that the parties conferred in good faith before seeking court action, Megginson’s motion did not contain that certification. The court nevertheless understood that the defendants had committed during the conference to produce any outstanding discovery owed to him.

The court granted Megginson’s motion to compel production. It directed the defendants to provide a photocopy of the OC gas canister, information about the number of gas bursts used, and any other information Megginson had requested during the November 20 conference by December 31, 2019. The defendants had to file proof of service by January 10, 2020. If information was unavailable, such as a photograph of the canister, the defendants were directed to explain why in a letter to the court.

Request for Counsel

The court had previously provided Megginson with information about and an application for volunteer appointed counsel. To the extent his letter asking about the status of counsel could be understood as an application for counsel, the court denied it without prejudice to renewal later. The court said it had not taken a position on the merits of such an application and directed Megginson to review the provided materials and submit the necessary information.

Disposition

The court denied Megginson’s motion for summary judgment, granted his motion to compel production, and denied his application for counsel without prejudice to renewal at a later date. It also certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from the order would not be taken in good faith and denied fee-free appeal status. The clerk was directed to mail Megginson a copy of the order by first-class and certified mail.