Seidemann v. Professional Staff Congress Local 2334

Background

David Seidemann and Bruce Martin brought a putative class action against Professional Staff Congress Local 2334, the Faculty Association of Suffolk County Community College, the United University Professions Farmingdale State College Chapter, the National Education Association of the United States, the American Federation of Teachers, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, the American Association of University Professors Collective Bargaining Congress, and New York State United Teachers.

Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, public employees could be required to pay agency shop fees to unions that represented them, even if they were not union members. Seidemann and Martin alleged that they had paid such fees before Janus without affirmatively consenting to them. They sought refunds under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, and brought state-law claims for conversion and unjust enrichment. They also sought a declaration that compulsory agency shop fees and the New York statute authorizing them were unconstitutional, along with an injunction against future collections.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which addresses subject-matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), which addresses whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Prospective Relief

The court dismissed the requests for a declaration and injunction under Rule 12(b)(1). It held that the plaintiffs had not alleged a present or future injury. Their complaint stated only that they had been required to pay fees before Janus; it did not allege that they had paid fees after that decision or that the defendants had failed to comply with it.

The court also relied on evidence that the unions, the plaintiffs’ employers, and the New York State Comptroller’s Office had stopped deducting agency shop fees after Janus and had reimbursed any fees deducted after June 27, 2018. The defendants also represented that they did not intend, and generally could not, resume those deductions. The court therefore concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek prospective relief. It stated that, even if mootness were the proper framework, those claims would be moot.

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the continued existence of New York Civil Service Law § 208 created a live controversy and that the voluntary-cessation exception applied. It concluded that Janus broadly prohibited public-sector unions and states from extracting agency fees from nonconsenting employees, including under New York’s statute.

Section 1983 Claims and the Good-Faith Defense

The plaintiffs sought damages and refunds under § 1983, alleging that the defendants violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The court assumed, without deciding, that the defendants acted under color of state law and therefore could be sued under § 1983. It also assumed, without deciding, that Janus applied retroactively.

The court held that private defendants may invoke a good-faith defense in a § 1983 action. Under that defense, private defendants are not liable for damages when they reasonably relied on a statute that had not yet been declared invalid. The court concluded that the defense applied to entities as well as individuals and was not limited to defendants performing governmental functions.

The court further held that the most appropriate common-law comparison was abuse of process rather than conversion. The plaintiffs’ core allegation concerned the use of a governmental process to collect fees, and good faith can be a defense to the comparable form of claim. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the defense was unavailable because they sought return of property, monetary relief, or relief characterized as equitable.

The court found that the defendants had acted in good faith as a matter of law. They had collected the fees under New York Civil Service Law § 208(3) and in compliance with the Supreme Court’s then-binding decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. The court concluded that relying on law that had not yet been held invalid was objectively reasonable. It therefore dismissed the § 1983 claims without allowing discovery into the defendants’ state of mind.

State-Law Claims

The plaintiffs also alleged conversion and unjust enrichment under New York law. The court held that New York Civil Service Law § 215 barred those claims. Section 215 provides a complete defense for certain claims concerning agency shop fees collected before June 27, 2018, when the fees were permitted or required under New York law then in force.

The court held that § 215 applied retroactively to this case and that § 208 was, in reality, in force before Janus, even though Janus later made compulsory agency fees unconstitutional. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to § 215. It held that the statute did not violate procedural due process, substantive due process, the federal or New York Takings Clauses, or Article VII, § 6 of the New York Constitution.

The court reasoned that the legislature could create substantive defenses or immunities for conduct that had been lawful under the prevailing law, and that the plaintiffs had no vested property right in their unadjudicated claims. It also found a sufficient relationship between § 215 and appropriations concerning public-employee compensation. The court therefore held that § 215 precluded all of the plaintiffs’ state-law claims.

Disposition

Judge Katherine Polk Failla granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in full. The court ordered that the plaintiffs’ claims be dismissed with prejudice, directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the pending motions and adjourned dates, and closed the case.

Classification Note

This is classified as a procedural order because the court disposed of the case through Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Although the court analyzed the good-faith defense and the state-law statutory defense, the order’s operative action was dismissal for lack of standing and failure to state a claim.