Lopez Pena v. Cole

Background

Julio Cesar Lopez Pena, who was incarcerated at FCI Allenwood, filed this action without a lawyer under Bivens, a legal framework that can allow claims for damages against federal officials who personally violate constitutional rights. He alleged due-process violations, deprivation of a liberty interest in being free from prosecution without probable cause, and unlawful custody. He sought monetary damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief.

The defendants included Terry Cole, identified as a Drug Enforcement Administration arresting officer; Jay Wineberg, identified as a Federal Bureau of Investigation special agent; several judges; several United States attorneys for the Southern District of New York; Walter J. Quinn, a probation officer; and Mary Ellen Warlow, identified as Director of the Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division. The court also identified the United States as a defendant for purposes of discussing the limits of Bivens claims.

Court records showed that Lopez Pena was incarcerated because of a conviction in this court for conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. He had received a 540-month sentence followed by five years of supervised release. He had previously challenged the conviction, including through a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 that was decided on the merits. His most recent challenge had been transferred to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Screening and Bivens claims

Because Lopez Pena was a prisoner proceeding without prepaying the filing fee, the court was required to screen the complaint. Under the applicable statutes, the court had to dismiss any portion that was frivolous, failed to state a legally sufficient claim, sought money from an immune defendant, or fell outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also explained that it had to read a self-represented litigant’s allegations generously, but the complaint still had to provide enough factual detail to make a claim plausible.

The court explained that Bivens claims may be brought only against federal officials personally responsible for constitutional violations, not against the United States or federal officials sued in their official capacities. It further noted that the Supreme Court has recognized damages remedies under Bivens in only three contexts: unreasonable searches and seizures, certain employment-discrimination claims, and inadequate medical treatment of prisoners. Expanding Bivens remedies is generally disfavored.

The court applied the rule from Heck v. Humphrey: when success on a damages claim would necessarily imply that a conviction or sentence is invalid, the claim cannot proceed unless that conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. The court found that Lopez Pena was indirectly challenging his conviction and had not alleged that it had been reversed or otherwise called into question. It therefore held that he failed to state a Bivens claim.

Immunity rulings

The court dismissed the claims against Denny Chin, Douglas F. Eaton, Andrew J. Peck, Robert W. Sweet, Ronald L. Ellis, and Frank Maas based on absolute judicial immunity. That doctrine generally protects judges from damages suits for actions taken within their judicial responsibilities. The court found that Lopez Pena’s claims against these defendants arose from their rulings and actions while presiding over his cases and were within their judicial roles and jurisdiction. The court also described claims barred by judicial immunity as frivolous for purposes of the prisoner filing-fee statute.

The court separately dismissed the claims against Kevin Ronald Puvalowski, Rebbeca Ann Monk, Marc Berger, Boyd Johnson III, Amy Finzi, Rebecca Ricigliano, Preet Bharara, and David N. Keley based on prosecutorial immunity. The court found that the challenged actions were within the prosecutors’ official duties and were connected to the judicial phase of the criminal process. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from damages claims for such conduct.

The court also dismissed the claims against Terry Cole, Jay Wineberg, Walter J. Quinn, and Mary Ellen Warlow. Sovereign immunity generally prevents suits against the federal government and its agencies unless immunity has been waived. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides a limited waiver for certain tort claims, but a claimant must first submit an administrative claim and receive a final written determination. The court found no indication that Lopez Pena had completed that process and dismissed these claims as barred by sovereign immunity.

Conviction challenge and disposition

The court stated that a federal prisoner seeking to challenge a conviction or sentence generally must use a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because Lopez Pena had already filed a § 2255 motion that was decided on the merits, he needed permission from the Second Circuit before filing a second or successive motion. The court concluded that the defects in his complaint could not be cured by amendment and therefore declined to grant leave to amend.

Chief United States District Judge Colleen McMahon ordered that the complaint, filed without prepayment of fees, be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii). The court certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to proceed without prepaying fees for the appeal. The opinion did not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.