Avent v. Keybank

Background

Reuben Avent, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Keybank; unidentified Keybank representatives; Roberta Reardon, identified as the superintendent of the New York State Department of Labor; Kerri Loveland, identified as an unidentified Department of Labor employee; and unidentified Department of Labor employees. He alleged that the Department of Labor stopped an electronic transfer of his unemployment benefits, sent the funds to a Keybank benefits account instead of his existing bank account, and failed to provide him with a usable bank card. He also alleged that the defendants denied him unemployment funds and federal stimulus funds, discriminated against African Americans, and retaliated against him for earlier litigation.

Avent asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1983, including race discrimination, equal-protection, due-process, conspiracy, and retaliation claims. He sought $40 million in compensatory damages and $80 million in punitive damages.

Screening Standard

Because Avent was allowed to proceed without prepaying fees, the court screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. That statute requires dismissal of an action that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks money from a defendant who is immune from such relief. The court also considered whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction. Although courts must read self-represented complaints generously, the complaint still must provide a short and plain statement showing entitlement to relief.

Race Discrimination and Equal Protection

The court explained that Section 1982 prohibits racial discrimination interfering with rights involving real or personal property. Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that a person acting under state authority violated a federal constitutional or statutory right, along with that defendant’s direct and personal involvement.

The court held that Avent did not allege facts showing that any defendant acted with racial hostility, took action against him because of his race, or treated him differently from similarly situated people. It therefore held that he failed to state race-discrimination or equal-protection claims under Sections 1982 and 1983. Because the complaint failed to state a claim, the court did not decide whether Keybank acted under state authority for purposes of Section 1983 liability.

Conspiracy and Retaliation

The court held that Avent did not provide specific facts showing that the defendants agreed to act together to cause an unconstitutional injury. It also held that he did not show a connection between his earlier lawsuit and the events involving his unemployment benefits. In addition, he did not allege how Reardon or Loveland were personally involved in the events described in the complaint. The court therefore held that he failed to state conspiracy and retaliation claims.

Due Process

The court recognized that unemployment benefits can be a protected property interest. It nevertheless held that New York provides procedures for challenging problems involving unemployment benefits, including an informal conference, a formal hearing before an administrative law judge, an appeal to the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, and possible judicial review in state court.

The court concluded that these procedures were adequate post-deprivation remedies. As a result, even assuming Avent had been deprived of benefits, the alleged deprivation did not support a federal due-process claim.

Disposition

The court dismissed Avent’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii), and granted him leave to replead. He was required to submit an amended complaint to the court’s Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days, identify it as an amended complaint, and use docket number 21-CV-01466. No summons was to issue at that time. The court stated that failure to comply could result in dismissal for failure to state a claim and on immunity grounds.

The court also warned that further nonmeritorious litigation in the district could lead to an order barring Avent from filing new actions without prepaying fees unless he first obtained permission. It certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to appeal without prepaying fees.