Marom v. Town of Greenburgh

Background

Michael Marom proceeded without a lawyer and sued the Town of Greenburgh and Paul Feiner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that the defendants discriminatorily enforced building rules against his property, arbitrarily refused to renew or extend a building permit, defamed him, attempted to take or interfere with his home through property-violation proceedings, violated an alleged rule against one-sided communications with a state judge, and breached a stipulation concerning the property-violation summonses. He also sought injunctive relief.

The dispute arose from Marom’s construction of a home on a vacant lot next to the Gordons’ property. Marom alleged that the Town issued numerous summonses for conditions on his property and that other developers and the Gordons were not similarly cited. He also alleged that statements made at a Town Board meeting were defamatory and that the Town later posted a recording of the meeting online. The state court later found Marom guilty of several property-code violations after a bench trial.

Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true, drew reasonable inferences for Marom, and construed his self-represented filing liberally. The court nevertheless required factual allegations making each claim plausible rather than merely possible.

Defamation

The court dismissed the first and second claims. New York law required Marom to serve a notice of claim within 90 days after the defamation claim arose. The alleged statements were made and published on April 18, 2017, but Marom did not serve his notice until December 4, 2017. The court rejected his argument that defamation was exempt from the notice requirement.

The court also held that, even if the notice had been timely, the claim would fail under New York’s fair-and-true-report privilege. The Town had published a complete recording of an official Town Board proceeding, and Marom did not allege that the recording had been altered.

Equal Protection

Marom alleged that the Town selectively enforced its building code and treated him differently from two developers on the same street and from the Gordons. The court considered both selective-enforcement and class-of-one theories. A selective-enforcement claim requires sufficiently similar comparators and an improper motive, such as discrimination, punishment for exercising constitutional rights, or malicious or bad-faith intent to injure. A class-of-one claim requires intentional differential treatment from extremely similar comparators without a rational basis.

The court concluded that Marom had not provided enough detail to show that the other properties were sufficiently similar. He did not describe whether the alleged debris was comparable in amount or scope, whether the same code provisions applied, or whether the other properties were at the same stage of development. The court also found that the numerous violations for which Marom was found guilty distinguished his property from the properties he identified.

The court further concluded that Marom had not plausibly connected Feiner’s alleged desire to demolish the home with the summonses actually issued by Building Inspector Dam. The allegations about Feiner’s role were made on information and belief, and Marom did not allege that Dam acted with personal malice toward him. The court also found that hostility toward the condition or use of property, without personal animus toward the plaintiff, was insufficient.

The court dismissed the class-of-one claim with prejudice. It dismissed the selective-enforcement claim without prejudice because, although the claim as pleaded was deficient, Marom might be able to add facts in good faith showing a sufficient comparison and improper motive.

Substantive Due Process

Marom alleged that the Town arbitrarily refused to renew or extend his building permit and that he had a property interest in enforcement of the building code against his neighbors. The court dismissed these claims with prejudice.

For a substantive due-process claim involving a land-use benefit, a plaintiff must show a clear entitlement to the benefit and government action that was arbitrary or irrational in an extreme and outrageous way. The court found that the Town’s permit process gave the building inspector discretion to review whether an application contained the required approvals. That discretion prevented Marom from showing a clear entitlement to renewal or issuance of the permit. The court also held that Marom’s allegation that the permit was denied without explanation did not describe conduct sufficiently egregious to violate substantive due process.

The court separately held that Marom had no legal entitlement to have local zoning or building laws enforced against his neighbors. It therefore dismissed the claim based on the Town’s alleged failure to enforce those laws.

Conversion

Marom’s conversion claim was based on the defendants’ alleged efforts to demolish his home. The court dismissed it with prejudice because conversion under New York law applies to personal property, not real property, and the claim concerned his home and development.

One-Sided Communications and Breach of Contract

Marom alleged that the Town sent photographs of his property to Justice Dolores Brathwaite without sending them to him, and that the Town violated a stipulation by continuing to prosecute the property-violation summonses. The court treated the alleged communication and contract theories together because Marom claimed that the communication caused Justice Brathwaite to reject the stipulation and order a trial.

The court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred these claims. That doctrine generally prevents a federal district court from reviewing a state-court judgment when the federal plaintiff lost in state court, complains of injuries caused by that judgment, asks the federal court to reject it, and the state judgment came before the federal case. The court found all four conditions satisfied because Marom was challenging Justice Brathwaite’s rejection of the stipulation and asking the federal court to undo the resulting decision. The court dismissed the sixth and seventh claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Injunctive Relief and Disposition

Marom requested orders concerning state proceedings involving his property and the closure of his driveway to pedestrian traffic. The court had already denied those requests in a December 21, 2018 order, and Marom had not added new facts. Because the court dismissed the complaint, it also denied the requested injunctive relief.

Judge McCarthy granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety. The Second Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice except for the selective-enforcement claim, which was dismissed without prejudice. Marom was permitted to file an amended complaint consistent with the decision within 21 days. If he did not meet that deadline, the selective-enforcement claim would be dismissed with prejudice.