Barnett v. Westchester County

Background

Jerome Barnett, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Westchester County; Westchester County Department of Corrections Commissioner Kevin M. Cheverko; Aramark Correctional Services, LLC; Aramark Food Service Director Manual Mendoza; and Aramark kitchen civilians Charles Butler, Coffey Kohli, Penny Stewart, and Craig Boissy. He brought the action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asserted claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Barnett alleged that, while he was a pretrial detainee at Westchester County Jail, he received cold, undercooked, moldy, stale, contaminated, and otherwise poor-quality food. He alleged that he became ill after eating undercooked meatballs, found hair and an insect in meals, and suffered symptoms including nausea, hunger, dehydration, weight loss, stomach pain, vomiting, headaches, and fatigue. He also alleged that he falsely identified himself as Jewish to obtain what he believed would be better meals, and claimed that the jail’s food practices burdened his religion and treated Jewish inmates differently.

Legal standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true and interpreted Barnett’s filings liberally because he was representing himself, but explained that it could not rewrite an inadequate complaint.

Municipal and official-capacity claims

The court dismissed Barnett’s claims against Westchester County and Aramark, and claims against individuals in their official capacities, under the municipal-liability framework commonly called Monell. Barnett alleged inadequate training and supervision and a longstanding pattern of substandard food, but the court found those allegations conclusory. It also found that Barnett’s references to earlier lawsuits, which had settled without admissions of liability, did not by themselves plausibly establish a widespread policy, custom, or deliberate indifference.

The court granted the motion to dismiss these claims without prejudice and with leave to replead.

Individual defendants and personal involvement

The court dismissed claims against Butler, Kohli, Stewart, Boissy, Cheverko, and Mendoza because Barnett did not plausibly allege their personal involvement. The allegations about the kitchen workers described conduct that apparently occurred about two months before Barnett’s arrival and did not connect that conduct to the specific food problems he experienced. As to Cheverko and Mendoza, Barnett relied largely on their supervisory positions, awareness of complaints or earlier litigation, and receipt of a complaint letter. The court held that those allegations, without more, did not establish personal involvement or supervisory liability.

The court granted the motion to dismiss these claims without prejudice and with leave to replead.

First Amendment free-exercise claim

The court dismissed Barnett’s claim that the defendants burdened his religious practice. A free-exercise claim generally requires a sincerely held religious belief that was substantially burdened by conduct lacking a reasonable connection to a legitimate prison interest. The court found that Barnett’s own allegation—that he pretended to be Jewish to obtain higher-quality meals—did not allege that a sincerely held religious belief had been violated.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the free-exercise claim without prejudice and with leave to amend.

Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim

Because Barnett was a pretrial detainee, the court analyzed his food-related conditions claim under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment. The court found that his allegations of undercooked food, moldy bread, rotted salads, insects, hair, and resulting illness were sufficient at the pleading stage to allege an objectively serious risk to his health.

The court nevertheless found that Barnett did not adequately allege the required mental state. He did not identify facts showing that any named defendant specifically knew about the inadequate food, provided it, was present when it was served, or knew of the particular incidents. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss the deliberate-indifference claim without prejudice and with leave to replead. The same deficiencies also defeated the related failure-to-intervene theory.

Equal Protection claim

The court treated Barnett’s separate discrimination and equal-protection counts as one claim based on alleged religious discrimination. It held that Barnett’s general statements that Jewish inmates were treated differently did not explain how he was treated differently from similarly situated inmates or show intentional discrimination.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the Equal Protection claim without prejudice and with leave to replead.

RLUIPA claim

The court dismissed the RLUIPA claim with prejudice. It held that RLUIPA does not authorize monetary-damages claims against state officials in their official or individual capacities. It also held that Barnett’s transfer to Cape Vincent Correctional Facility made his requests for declaratory or injunctive relief concerning conditions at Westchester County Jail moot.

RFRA claim

The court dismissed the RFRA claim with prejudice because the Supreme Court had invalidated RFRA as applied to states and their subdivisions. The opinion treated the defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim as granted with prejudice.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Barnett was given until April 9, 2020, to file an amended complaint addressing claims that had not been dismissed with prejudice. The defendants were directed to answer or otherwise respond by May 25, 2020. The court stated that failure to file an amended complaint within the permitted time, absent good cause, would result in dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.