Smith v. Lioidice

Background

Steven L. Smith, proceeding without a lawyer, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against I.R.C. Lioidice, Warden Griffin, and Dep. Collado in their official and individual capacities. He alleged that they delayed processing and filing forms intended to transfer him to Connecticut, where criminal charges were pending, and that Lioidice retaliated against him for filing prison grievances. Smith asserted rights under the First Amendment and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.

Smith alleged that he submitted the forms in June 2016 and repeatedly sought updates. He filed a grievance in September 2016, pursued administrative appeals, and alleged that Lioidice continued delaying the forms after a grievance hearing. The forms were ultimately mailed on February 15, 2017. Smith claimed the delay prevented him from resolving an outstanding Connecticut warrant before his release on parole and caused him to lose an opportunity to receive a concurrent sentence.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

The defendants argued that Smith’s claims should be dismissed because he had not completed the prison grievance process required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Smith had pursued the grievance through the facility-level steps and appealed to the Central Office Review Committee, but he had not received a decision on that appeal.

The court held that the administrative remedy was functionally unavailable because the appeal had remained pending for more than two years. It therefore excused Smith’s failure to wait for the final administrative decision and did not dismiss the case on exhaustion grounds.

Interstate Agreement on Detainers and access to the courts

The court explained that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers applies when a detainer has been lodged against a prisoner. Connecticut had not lodged a detainer against Smith and had advised the facility that it would not pick him up upon release. The court therefore concluded that the agreement had not been activated and that Smith was not positioned to use its procedures.

The court treated Smith’s allegations about delayed forms as access-to-the-courts claims under the First Amendment. Such a claim requires a deliberate and malicious act that caused actual injury by frustrating a nonfrivolous legal claim. The court found that Smith had not plausibly shown either a qualifying legal claim under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers or a connection between the delayed forms and the claimed harms, including the possible concurrent sentence. The access-to-the-courts claims against Lioidice, Griffin, and Collado were dismissed without prejudice. The court granted leave to replead facts that could plausibly show that a detainer had been lodged and that Smith suffered actual injury from the delay.

First Amendment retaliation

Smith alleged that Lioidice retaliated against him after he filed a grievance by falsely stating that he had failed to appear when called and by delaying the forms for an additional period. The court accepted that filing a prison grievance is protected conduct for purposes of a retaliation claim.

The court nevertheless found that Smith had not plausibly alleged the required adverse action. It concluded that the alleged delay in sending the forms, without more, did not rise to the level of constitutionally actionable retaliation, and Smith admitted that he was not disciplined because of Lioidice’s alleged false statement. The retaliation claim against Lioidice was dismissed without prejudice, with leave to replead facts plausibly showing a causally connected adverse action.

Disposition

Judge Nelson S. Roman granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety. The access-to-the-courts claims and the retaliation claim were each dismissed without prejudice. Smith could file an amended complaint by the deadline specified in the order. The order stated that failing to file an amended complaint within the permitted time, absent good cause, would result in dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. The court did not reach the defendants’ arguments about personal involvement, qualified immunity, or Eleventh Amendment immunity because its ruling concerning the non-activation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers was dispositive of those claims.