Duverny v. Hercules Medical P.C.

Background

Leonides Duverny sued Hyperion Medical P.C., Hercules Medical P.C., Achilles Medical P.C., and Geoffrey Richstone. The opinion states that Hyperion did business under the names Hercules Medical P.C. and Achilles Medical P.C., and that Richstone was Hyperion’s office manager who oversaw hiring and firing.

Duverny alleged that the defendants denied her overtime pay; failed to provide required wage notices and wage statements; and discriminated against her based on sex, national origin, religion, and disability. Her discrimination claims arose under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. She also asserted wage claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law.

Duverny worked as a billing assistant for roughly six months beginning November 2, 2015. She alleged that Richstone made sexually and racially offensive remarks, pressured her to accept gifts and attend social events, required her to undergo a medical examination, touched her genitals during one examination, and fired her after she refused another examination. The defendants disputed some of these allegations and asserted that she was fired after taking her medical file.

Summary-Judgment Standard

The court applied the Rule 56 summary-judgment standard. Summary judgment is appropriate only when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court viewed disputed facts in the light most favorable to Duverny, the party opposing the motion.

Wage and Overtime Claims

The court granted summary judgment on Duverny’s federal and state overtime claims. The defendants’ time records showed that Duverny did not work more than 40 hours in any week after deducting her daily 30-minute lunch break. Duverny did not dispute that employees received those lunch breaks or claim that she had to work during them. The court therefore treated the breaks as noncompensable meal periods.

Duverny also testified that on some days she arrived early and waited 30 to 40 minutes for someone to open the office. The court held that this general assertion did not create a genuine factual dispute because she did not explain whether the waiting occurred before her scheduled workday, how often it occurred, or on which dates. The court granted the defendants’ motion on both the Fair Labor Standards Act and parallel New York Labor Law overtime claims, and the opinion states that those claims were dismissed.

The court denied summary judgment on Duverny’s claim that the defendants paid her final wages late under New York Labor Law § 191(3). Duverny’s final paychecks were not delivered until August 2016, after her May 10 termination, through a Department of Labor conciliation agreement. The court held that receiving the base wages did not bar her from seeking statutory damages because the defendants offered no evidence that she intended to give up those damages.

The court also denied summary judgment on the claim that the defendants’ wage statements failed to list her overtime rate. The three statements submitted by the defendants did not include that rate. It likewise denied summary judgment on the wage-notice claim because the notice listed her regular rate but not her individual overtime rate; a general statement that most New York employees receive one-and-a-half times their hourly wage was not enough.

Sex-Based Claims

The court denied summary judgment on Duverny’s sex-based hostile-work-environment claims under Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The defendants argued that any mistreatment resulted from personal hostility connected to a claimed romantic relationship, rather than sex discrimination. Duverny denied that she and Richstone had a romantic relationship. The court held that this factual dispute, along with the evidence of Richstone’s conduct, prevented summary judgment. It also rejected the argument that Duverny’s ability to perform her job well defeated her claim.

The court also denied summary judgment on Duverny’s separate claim that she was fired because she refused a second medical examination. Duverny presented testimony that Richstone demanded the examination because she was a woman and because he wanted to see and touch her. The court held that a jury must decide whether the examination was demanded, why it was demanded, and whether her refusal led to her termination. The defendants’ alternative explanation that she was fired for taking her medical file did not resolve those factual disputes.

National-Origin Claim

The court denied summary judgment on Duverny’s national-origin hostile-work-environment claim. The opinion states that Duverny identified Richstone’s comments about Haitians and related conduct involving racial imagery. The defendants argued that Richstone could not have acted because of her national origin because he was fond of Haitians and had a son of Haitian descent. The court held that a jury must decide whether Duverny experienced a hostile work environment and whether the conduct occurred because of her national origin.

Administrative Exhaustion and Corporate Defendants

Hyperion argued that Duverny’s Title VII hostile-work-environment claim against it should be dismissed because she named Hercules, but not Hyperion, in her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge. The court denied that argument. Applying the identity-of-interest exception, the court held that Hyperion had sufficiently similar interests to the named parties and had notice of the allegations. The court noted that Richstone participated in the administrative proceedings and that Hyperion and Hercules appeared interchangeable in some employment records.

The defendants also sought dismissal of claims against Hercules and Achilles on the ground that those companies were defunct and not under the same ownership as Hyperion. The court denied that request because the parties disputed the companies’ corporate relationship and Duverny submitted documentation that all three were active New York corporations.

Americans with Disabilities Act Claim

The court denied summary judgment on Duverny’s claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act concerning the medical examination. The statute generally bars an employer from requiring an employee to undergo a medical examination unless the examination is job-related and consistent with business necessity. The court held that the parties disputed whether the defendants required the examination as a condition of employment and whether the examination was unwanted.

The defendants also argued in their reply that Duverny had not exhausted this claim through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The court rejected that argument, finding that her charge described the examination, her discomfort with it, and Richstone’s statement that it was a condition of employment. The court concluded that she had exhausted the claim.

Religious-Discrimination Claim

The court granted summary judgment on Duverny’s New York City Human Rights Law religious-discrimination claim. Duverny relied on Richstone’s comments that she was “brainwashed” and “self-righteous” because of her religion. The court held that these isolated comments, which were unrelated to her job performance or position, did not raise a factual question about a hostile work environment under the city law. Although a single highly discriminatory comment can sometimes support such a claim, the court found that these comments were not more than offensive or unkind remarks and did not show obvious discrimination or address her standing in the workplace.

Disposition

The court’s conclusion states that the defendants’ August 21, 2019 motion for summary judgment was denied with the following exceptions: the defendants were granted summary judgment on Duverny’s unpaid-overtime claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law, and on her religious-discrimination claim under the New York City Human Rights Law.