Garrido v. New York City Department Of Education
- Ronnie Abrams
- 1:16-cv-09464
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 10
In Garrido v. Klainberg, Judge Abrams denied default judgment, set aside the default, and dismissed Garrido’s discrimination claims with prejudice because service was defective and allegations were insufficient.
Isabel Garrido’s discrimination claims against Rachelle Klainberg were dismissed with prejudice. The court also denied Garrido’s request for default judgment and set aside the default against Klainberg. The claims against the New York City Department of Education had already been dismissed with prejudice.
What happened
In Garrido v. Klainberg, Isabel Garrido sued Rachelle Klainberg over her suspension and termination from the New York City Department of Education, alleging discrimination based on race and national origin. The claims against the Department had already been dismissed with prejudice.
Garrido asked for a judgment because Klainberg had not responded. Klainberg asked the court to cancel the default and dismiss the amended complaint. She argued that Garrido had not properly served her, and the court found that the complaint was delivered to a colleague who was not shown to be authorized to accept it, while the amended complaint was mailed to a building where Klainberg said she did not work.
Judge Ronnie Abrams denied Garrido’s request for default judgment, granted Klainberg’s request to set aside the default, and granted Klainberg’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed Garrido’s claims against Klainberg with prejudice, finding that the amended complaint did not plausibly allege that race or national origin caused the suspension or termination.
The detailed version
- Garrido v. New York City Department Of Education · No. 1:16-cv-09464
- Ronnie Abrams
- Mar. 6, 2020
Background
Isabel Garrido sued the New York City Department of Education and Rachelle Klainberg, alleging discrimination under federal laws concerning race and contracting rights, a federal civil-rights statute, and the New York City Human Rights Law. Garrido alleged that she was suspended without pay and later terminated after being accused of using corporal punishment on a student. She claimed that Klainberg, the principal of the school where Garrido worked, treated a white male employee more favorably after he was accused of similar conduct.
The claims against the Department of Education had previously been dismissed with prejudice. Klainberg had not appeared in the case, and the Clerk later entered a default against her. Garrido then moved for default judgment.
Default and Service of Process
Klainberg cross-moved to set aside the default and to dismiss the amended complaint. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), a court may set aside an entry of default for good cause. The court considered the preference for resolving disputes on their merits and the requirement that a defendant be properly served before a default judgment can be entered.
The court found that Garrido did not meet her burden of showing proper service. Although the filed certificate checked a box for personal service, the document indicated that the summons and complaint had been delivered to Helen Kaufman, a colleague at the Department of Education, rather than to Klainberg personally. The certificate did not show that Kaufman was authorized to accept service or that the papers were mailed to Klainberg as required by the applicable state-law service procedure. The amended complaint was mailed to an address at the Tweed Courthouse, but Klainberg stated that she had never been assigned to work there and never received the papers.
The court also rejected Garrido’s late request for a hearing about service. It concluded that a hearing was unnecessary because the manner of service was not disputed and the papers themselves showed the relevant method of delivery.
Motion to Dismiss
The court applied the standard for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. A complaint must allege enough facts to make liability reasonably plausible, and courts accept factual allegations as true while disregarding legal conclusions presented as facts.
The court agreed with the earlier ruling dismissing Garrido’s claims against the Department of Education. It concluded that the amended complaint did not provide even minimal support for the allegation that Klainberg suspended or terminated Garrido because of her race or national origin. The court also agreed that Garrido and the white male employee were not shown to be similarly situated for purposes of the discrimination claims, and that Garrido had not alleged other comparable employees who were suspended or terminated because of race or national origin. Garrido’s personal belief about the reason for her suspension and termination was not enough to state a discrimination claim.
Disposition
The court denied Garrido’s motion for default judgment, granted Klainberg’s motion to set aside the default, and granted Klainberg’s motion to dismiss. Garrido’s claims against Klainberg were dismissed with prejudice, and the court directed the Clerk of Court to close the case.
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.