Donas v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees

Background

Harry G. Donas sued the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act. He originally filed a petition under New York’s Article 78 procedure in state court, arguing that the union violated its constitution when it disciplined him for recording a Local 375 executive committee meeting.

Local 375’s executive committee had passed a motion banning most audio and video recording at its meetings. Donas recorded a March 2, 2016 meeting despite being asked to stop. Other committee members charged him under the union’s constitution. After an internal union trial, the trial officer found him guilty and issued a formal reprimand and warning. The full Judicial Panel upheld that decision, and the union’s International Convention later adopted the Judicial Panel’s decision.

Donas argued that the recording ban was invalid because it was not properly adopted under Robert’s Rules of Order, that the union failed to treat similar cases alike, that it failed to follow its own rules, and that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. He also sought at least $22,620 in damages.

Jurisdiction

The court concluded that removal to federal court was proper because Donas’s claims required interpretation of the AFSCME International Constitution, which the court treated as a labor contract covered by Section 301. The court also concluded that Donas could sue under Section 301 as a private employee of Local 375 because he received compensation for his union positions, even though he was also an employee of New York City.

The court noted that a local union’s constitution is not a contract between labor organizations for purposes of Section 301. Therefore, to the extent Donas relied on the Local 375 constitution, the court stated that it did not have jurisdiction to analyze that claim.

Summary-judgment standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court must draw reasonable inferences for the nonmoving party, but that party must identify evidence rather than rely on conclusory statements.

Merits of the union-constitution challenge

Federal courts give substantial deference to a union’s interpretation of its own constitution. The interpretation must be upheld unless it is patently unreasonable—meaning inconsistent with clear constitutional language—or made in bad faith.

The court rejected Donas’s challenge to the recording ban. It held that the trial officer reasonably limited the internal proceeding to whether Donas violated the motion, rather than deciding whether the motion had been properly adopted. The union’s rules gave the trial officer authority to rule on procedural matters and relevant evidence. The court also found it reasonable to treat the motion as valid unless and until it was successfully challenged. Donas could have challenged the motion at a later meeting or through another union proceeding, but instead recorded the meeting after the motion had passed.

The court also rejected Donas’s argument that the union failed to decide similar cases similarly. The earlier union decisions he cited were not factually comparable because they involved different issues, including whether a policy violated substantive rights under the union constitution.

The court found no basis for Donas’s argument that the union failed to follow its own rules. It further held that the union constitution required the person bringing the charge to bear the burden of proof but did not specify a particular proof standard. In any event, Donas had admitted recording the meeting, so the court found it was not unreasonable for the trial officer to find him guilty.

Bad faith

The court explained that bad faith could be shown by evidence that the union acted against its own interests, acted outrageously, or acted with a sinister motive or personal financial interest. It found no such evidence connected to the trial officer’s decision or the Judicial Panel’s affirmance. The other conduct Donas identified was either unrelated to those decisions or did not show that the officials acted in bad faith in interpreting the union constitution.

Disposition

The court held that the record did not support a finding that the union’s process involved a patently unreasonable interpretation of its constitution or bad faith. Judge John G. Koeltl granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Clerk was directed to enter judgment dismissing the complaint, close the case, and close all pending motions.