Calise v. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Background

Mary Ann Calise worked as a Motor Vehicles Representative at a DMV office in White Plains, New York, from July 2008 until October 16, 2017. She proceeded without a lawyer and without paying the filing fee. She sued the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles and Andrea Parker, alleging race and color discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The case originally included claims against the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and state-law claims. Earlier orders dismissed those claims. Another earlier order dismissed all claims against the DMV except Calise’s Title VII discrimination claim, and allowed her to pursue § 1981 and § 1983 claims against Parker. The remaining claims were Calise’s Title VII claim against the DMV and her § 1981 and § 1983 claims against Parker.

Evidence and allegations

Calise received unsatisfactory performance evaluations in 2010, 2011, and 2012. The evaluations cited attendance problems, tardiness, cashiering errors, and other workplace issues. She received satisfactory evaluations beginning in 2014. By mid-2017, she had received counseling memoranda and notices of discipline concerning attendance, cashiering, work performance, and other conduct. In June 2017, the DMV issued a notice stating that it intended to terminate her because of alleged incompetence or misconduct based on excessive unscheduled absences. Calise later resigned, sending a letter that attributed her resignation to harassment and retaliation by Parker.

Calise alleged that Parker denied her overtime, marked her late while allowing non-white employees to sign in on time, disciplined her for conduct for which non-white employees were not disciplined, delayed her request for an ergonomic chair, and gave her unsatisfactory evaluations because she is white. She also relied on workplace comments and conduct, including Parker’s use of the phrase “snitches get stitches,” references to another employee as “Brother Malcolm,” alleged references to Calise as “dumb white girl,” “token white girl,” and “Sherraine [Herron-Muir]’s white daughter,” and an allegedly hostile workplace culture.

Limitations and exhaustion

The court held that Calise’s Title VII claims against the DMV could not be based on conduct before August 2, 2014, because she filed her administrative discrimination charge on May 29, 2015 and Title VII generally requires a charge within 300 days of the alleged discrimination. The court also held that the DMV was not entitled to summary judgment on exhaustion grounds for conduct after May 29, 2015, because those allegations concerned the same alleged race-based discrimination and were reasonably related to the administrative charge.

The court held that Calise’s § 1981 claim against Parker could not be based on conduct before January 31, 2014. The court explained that § 1983 provides the federal damages remedy for a § 1981 claim against a state actor and that the applicable limitations period was three years.

Summary-judgment standard

Summary judgment is granted when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court does not resolve genuine factual disputes for a jury, but a party opposing summary judgment must present evidence that could support a favorable jury verdict. The court stated that unsupported assertions and inadmissible hearsay were insufficient.

Racial-discrimination claims

The court applied the burden-shifting framework used for Title VII and § 1981 discrimination claims. Under that framework, a plaintiff must first present basic evidence supporting an inference of discrimination. The employer or defendant may then give a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. The plaintiff must ultimately present enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason.

Regarding overtime, the court found that Calise had not produced evidence showing that she was denied overtime because of race. Her time records showed that she received overtime on many days she worked. The collective bargaining agreement required overtime to be offered according to seniority, and Calise ranked eleventh among twenty employees. The court found no evidence that less-senior non-white employees received overtime instead of her, and no evidence that the seniority policy was a pretext for discrimination.

Regarding sign-in procedures, the court found that Calise’s assertions were unsupported and contradicted by DMV records. The records showed that employees she identified as comparators were marked tardy on the dates at issue and that non-white employees received counseling memoranda and discipline for tardiness. The court also found no evidence that the DMV’s fifteen-minute grace-period policy was applied preferentially to non-white employees.

Regarding the 2010, 2011, and 2012 evaluations, the court held that the claims were time-barred. The court further stated that, even if they were timely, the record did not support a connection between the evaluations and race. The evaluations identified cashiering errors and attendance problems, and Parker had given at least one African-American employee an unsatisfactory evaluation.

Regarding the ergonomic chair, the court held that the claims concerning requests made from 2011 through 2013 were time-barred. It also found no record evidence of requests in 2011 or 2012 and found that the documented 2013 request was processed and granted, with Calise receiving an ergonomic chair in early 2014.

Finally, the court held that Calise’s remaining complaints did not show an adverse employment action—an employment decision or condition materially harming her job. The court stated that alleged workplace grievances, comments, gospel music, lunch assignments, the “bully” sign, and alleged denials of breaks or personal phone calls did not materially affect her employment. Considering the record as a whole, the court characterized the evidence as showing at most a personality conflict rather than a triable race-discrimination claim.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It directed the Clerk to terminate the motion and close the case. It also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied Calise permission to proceed without paying the appeal filing fee.