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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Mar. 23, 2020

Woodward v. White

Judge
Colleen McMahon
Docket
1:19-cv-10281
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
7
Civil RightsSection 1983Pro SeCivil Procedure
In one sentence

In Woodward v. White, Judge McMahon dismissed Shawn Woodward’s civil-rights lawsuit as untimely, barred, and insufficiently pleaded.

Who this affects

Shawn Woodward’s claims against Judge Renee A. White, Michael Butchen, Elon Harpaz, Alex Spiro, and Cyrus Vance were dismissed; the order also denied permission to proceed without prepaying fees for an appeal.

What happened

In Woodward v. White, Shawn Woodward sued a state judge, prosecutors, and Legal Aid Society attorneys over events during his New York criminal proceedings. He represented himself and sought to withdraw his guilty plea and obtain money damages.

Woodward alleged that his attorney did not tell him about post-release supervision when he accepted an 18-year sentence in 2000. He also challenged a 2012 proceeding concerning that sentence, which occurred without him present, and alleged that officials violated his rights.

Judge Colleen McMahon dismissed the complaint. She ruled that the claims were filed too late, that the requested plea challenge could not be brought through this type of civil-rights lawsuit, that damages claims were barred because the conviction had not been invalidated, and that the defendants were otherwise immune or not proper defendants under the civil-rights law.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Woodward v. White · No. 1:19-cv-10281
Judge
Colleen McMahon
Date
Mar. 23, 2020

Background

Shawn Woodward, who was incarcerated at South Woods State Prison in Bridgeton, New Jersey, filed this lawsuit without a lawyer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute. The defendants were New York County Court Judge Renee A. White; Michael Butchen and Elon Harpaz of the Legal Aid Society; Alex Spiro, an Assistant District Attorney of New York County; and Cyrus Vance, the District Attorney of New York County. Woodward sued them in both their individual and official capacities.

Woodward’s claims arose from his state-court criminal proceedings. According to the complaint, he was arrested in New York County in 2000, and Butchen represented him and persuaded him to accept a plea agreement for a determinate sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment. Woodward alleged that Butchen did not tell him that post-release supervision would be part of the sentence and that Judge White did not mention it during the plea proceeding.

In or around February 2012, after Judge White was notified that the 2000 sentence did not include post-release supervision, she ordered Woodward to appear in court to correct the sentence. Woodward told Harpaz, who was then representing him, that he wanted to withdraw his plea. Woodward alleged that Judge White argued he had no legal basis to withdraw the plea and adjourned the proceeding.

Woodward did not appear at the April 17, 2012 hearing because his facility did not receive an order to produce him. The hearing nevertheless proceeded. Judge White stated that the prosecution was withdrawing its request to impose post-release supervision, and Harpaz said Woodward did not need to be present because that issue was resolved. Judge White also stated that Woodward’s presence was unnecessary because he was not being resentenced and that his motion to withdraw the plea was moot. She then questioned Harpaz’s authority to waive Woodward’s signature and directed Harpaz to place Woodward’s initials on a document stating that he agreed with the court’s decision. Harpaz also signed Woodward’s name on an order stating that Woodward was resentenced to the original sentence without post-release supervision.

Woodward alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and denial of due process based on Butchen’s handling of the plea. He also alleged that Judge White, Haskin, Spiro, and Vance denied him due process and access to the courts during the 2012 proceedings. He sought withdrawal of his 2000 guilty plea and money damages.

Screening standard and timeliness

Because Woodward was allowed to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, the court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Those statutes require dismissal of claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a legally sufficient claim, seek money from an immune defendant, or fall outside the court’s jurisdiction. The court also said it had to read a self-represented litigant’s allegations liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest claims suggested by the allegations.

The court held that the claims appeared untimely. Section 1983 claims use New York’s three-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, and such claims generally accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury. The court received Woodward’s action on November 4, 2019, more than seven years and seven months after the latest alleged event, the April 17, 2012 proceeding. Although courts ordinarily allow a plaintiff an opportunity to plead facts supporting equitable tolling before dismissing on limitations grounds, this court found dismissal appropriate because the claims also failed for other reasons.

Requested withdrawal of the guilty plea

The court ruled that a Section 1983 civil-rights action was not the proper vehicle for challenging the validity of Woodward’s guilty plea or seeking release from custody. The court said that relief could be sought only through a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal procedure for a state prisoner challenging custody. It declined to treat Woodward’s complaint as such a petition because he alleged no facts showing that he had exhausted available state remedies. The court stated that he had to exhaust those remedies before seeking to withdraw his guilty plea through a federal custody challenge.

Claims for damages

The court applied the favorable-termination rule from Heck v. Humphrey. That rule generally bars a prisoner’s Section 1983 damages claim when success would necessarily show that the conviction or sentence is invalid, unless the conviction or sentence has already been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or invalidated through federal custody review.

The court found that Woodward’s guilty plea had not been overturned or otherwise invalidated. Because success on his claims arising from the criminal proceedings and sentence would necessarily imply that his conviction was invalid, the court held that the rule barred his claims for money damages.

Defendant-specific grounds

The court further stated that Woodward had not pleaded plausible Section 1983 claims against the defendants even apart from the limitations and favorable-termination bars. Judge White was absolutely immune from damages claims based on actions within her judicial responsibilities. Vance and Spiro were absolutely immune from claims based on prosecuting Woodward’s criminal proceedings. Butchen and Harpaz, as private attorneys, were not acting under the state authority required for Section 1983 liability, according to the court.

Disposition

The court dismissed Woodward’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). It directed the clerk to mail him the order and record service on the docket, and it terminated all other pending matters. The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to proceed without prepaying fees for purposes of an appeal.

The authoritative version

Read the full 7-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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