Masri v. Thorsen

Background

Joseph H. Masri sued Eric O. Thorsen, Thorsen Law Offices, Esther R. Masri, and Zion Saal. Masri represented himself. He asserted a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and claims under New York law for slander, slander per se, libel, libel per se, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Masri alleged that Esther R. Masri and Thorsen retained or worked with others to publicly attack him and to raise money connected to an alleged plan to kidnap or kill him. He alleged that Saal helped publish material on a website, that leaflets were distributed, and that Thorsen made statements about him at a public gathering. Masri claimed that these actions harmed his reputation, employment prospects, emotional well-being, ability to obtain legal counsel, and ability to travel safely in New York and Kiryas Joel. He sought at least $20 million in compensatory and punitive damages and requested a recommendation that Thorsen be permanently disbarred.

Masri originally asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985(3), and New York law. An earlier court order dismissed the § 1983 claims because the defendants were private parties and directed Masri to amend his § 1985(3) claim. Masri later filed an amended complaint. After the defendants moved to dismiss, the court gave Masri additional opportunities to file a second amended complaint, but he did not do so by the applicable deadlines.

Section 1985(3) Claim

To state a claim under § 1985(3), Masri needed to allege a conspiracy, a purpose to deny equal protection of the laws, an act advancing the conspiracy, and a resulting deprivation of a federal right. Because the alleged conspiracy was between private parties, he also needed to allege that it targeted a right protected against private interference, as well as class-based discriminatory animus and facts supporting an agreement among the defendants.

The court held that Masri’s allegations of religious animus were conclusory. He alleged that the defendants acted because of hostility toward his ultra-Orthodox religious beliefs, but the court found that he did not provide specific facts showing a causal connection between the defendants’ actions and his religion. The court noted that Thorsen’s references to Masri as a “bad Jew” and as someone who should act like a “devoted Jew” did not, in context, show that the defendants acted against Masri because of his religion. The court also noted that the statement published on Saal’s website referred to the religion of the readers, not to Masri’s religion.

The court concluded that Masri’s alleged reputational harm, employment-related harm, emotional distress, and interference with access to legal counsel did not identify rights actionable under § 1985(3) against these private defendants. The court recognized that Masri’s allegations about threats to kidnap or kill him and his resulting fear of traveling could plausibly implicate the constitutional right to travel within a state. But because Masri had not adequately alleged discriminatory animus, the court did not decide whether he had sufficiently pleaded a conspiracy aimed at depriving him of that right.

The court also discussed, but did not decide, whether Masri was attempting to invoke the part of § 1985(3) concerning interference with state law enforcement. It stated that Masri had not alleged that the conspiracy was intended to interfere with law enforcement or provided sufficient facts showing that it was directed at a protected class.

State-Law Claims and Disposition

Because the federal claim was dismissed before trial, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the court’s authority to hear related state-law claims—over Masri’s state-law claims at that stage. The court stated that Masri could reassert those claims if he filed a second amended complaint addressing the deficiencies in his federal claim and the issues raised by the defendants.

The court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. Because this was the first adjudication of Masri’s claims, the dismissal was without prejudice. The court allowed Masri 30 days from the date of the Opinion and Order to file a second amended complaint. That complaint would replace, rather than supplement, the earlier complaints and would need to include all claims, factual allegations, and exhibits he wished the court to consider. The court stated that if Masri failed to meet the deadline, the dismissed claims may be dismissed with prejudice.