Stone v. 23rd Chelsea Associates, LLC
- Vernon Broderick
- 1:18-cv-03869
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 18
In Stone v. 23rd Chelsea Associates, Judge Broderick granted defendants’ dismissal motion because Stone’s claims were untimely or implausibly pleaded.
Richard E. Stone’s claims against 23rd Chelsea Associates, Related Management Companies, Tate Luxury Apartments, Jerod Wiggins, and Adam Gollub were dismissed without prejudice.
What happened
Stone v. 23rd Chelsea Associates involved Richard E. Stone’s claims that his landlord and related defendants discriminated against him because of race. He sued under several federal, state, and city laws, including housing-discrimination laws, and represented himself without a lawyer.
Stone alleged that defendants charged different rents, sided with white tenants, ignored complaints, monitored him, made discriminatory statements, and engaged in other unfair treatment. He also invoked the Federal Tort Claims Act, a law that generally applies to claims against the United States.
Judge Vernon S. Broderick granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. He concluded that the discrimination claims were filed too late and did not plausibly connect the alleged conduct to racial discrimination; the Federal Tort Claims Act did not apply to these private defendants. The court dismissed Stone’s claims without prejudice and closed the case.
The detailed version
- Stone v. 23rd Chelsea Associates, LLC · No. 1:18-cv-03869
- Vernon Broderick
- Mar. 30, 2020
Background
Richard E. Stone, proceeding without a lawyer, sued 23rd Chelsea Associates, Related Management Companies, Tate Luxury Apartments, Jerod Wiggins, and Adam Gollub. He described the defendants as his landlord and related entities and individuals. Stone alleged racial discrimination under the Fair Housing Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The court also liberally construed his filings as asserting a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Stone alleged that defendants charged him a higher rent based on race, sided with white tenants in disputes, ignored his complaints, monitored him, entered or tried to enter his apartment unlawfully, and made discriminatory comments. He also described incidents involving building personnel and white tenants dating back to 2003. Stone filed a housing-discrimination complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development in 2017 and later complained directly to the New York State Division of Human Rights. The state agency determined that there was no probable cause to believe defendants violated the relevant New York law.
Legal standard
Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally plausible claim. On such a motion, the court generally accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences for the plaintiff, but it does not accept bare legal conclusions. The court also applies a more flexible reading to filings by a person without a lawyer, while still requiring factual allegations that support a plausible claim.
Federal Tort Claims Act claim
The court held that the Federal Tort Claims Act applies to certain tort claims against the United States and does not provide a claim against private entities or individuals. Because Stone sued private defendants, the court found this claim frivolous and dismissed it on its own authority under the statute governing cases filed without payment of filing fees.
Housing-discrimination claims
The court addressed claims under the Fair Housing Act, Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Law, and Title VI. It explained that the relevant housing-discrimination claims generally require facts suggesting that the plaintiff experienced adverse treatment because of race or another protected characteristic.
The court determined that the claims were untimely to the extent they relied on conduct outside the applicable limitations periods. It calculated that, at the latest, the relevant periods began on March 12, 2015, for the Fair Housing Act claim; March 1, 2014, for the state and city claims; and April 30, 2015, for the Title VI claim. The court considered the December 2016 threat by “Gerard” and the March 2017 use of white tenants’ complaints in an attempted eviction as the only alleged conduct within any of those periods. It found those allegations too vague to support an inference that defendants acted because of Stone’s race.
The court also rejected reliance on the continuing-violation doctrine, which can sometimes extend the filing period for an ongoing discriminatory practice. It held that Stone had not alleged an unlawful act within the limitations period and that his older allegations were generic, conclusory, and sporadic. The court found that his allegations about rent differences, treatment during disputes, monitoring, and other conduct did not provide enough information to show that defendants followed an ongoing discriminatory policy or treated similarly situated white tenants differently.
Because Stone failed to allege facts supporting an inference of discrimination, the court stated that the Fair Housing Act, Title VI, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law claims had to be dismissed on that ground as well. The court did not reach defendants’ remaining arguments, including arguments concerning individual liability under some of the statutes.
Disposition
Judge Vernon S. Broderick granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court dismissed Stone’s claims without prejudice, directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion, and closed the case.
Read the full 18-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.