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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled Apr. 15, 2021

Alvarez v. New York City Department of Education

Judge
Vernon Broderick
Docket
1:20-cv-00255
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
24
EmploymentCivil ProcedureMotion to DismissCivil Rights
In one sentence

In Alvarez v. New York City Department of Education, Judge Broderick granted in part and denied in part the Department’s motion to dismiss discrimination claims.

Who this affects

Evelyn Alvarez’s discrimination and retaliation claims against the New York City Department of Education. Some claims were dismissed, while others were allowed to continue.

What happened

Evelyn Alvarez, a teacher, alleged that the New York City Department of Education treated her unfairly because of her age, sex, and knee-related disability, and retaliated after she complained. She said the Department canceled her English-as-a-New-Language class while a younger male teacher kept his, later extended her probation, issued her an excess letter, and continued harassing her.

The court dismissed Alvarez’s state and city disability claims, earlier-accruing state and city age and sex claims, and disability-retaliation claims. It allowed her federal age and sex claims, later-accruing state and city age and sex claims, and age- and sex-retaliation claims to continue. The court also allowed the claims to proceed despite the Department’s argument that Alvarez had waived them in a probation agreement.

In Alvarez v. New York City Department of Education, Judge Vernon S. Broderick ruled on April 15, 2021, that the Department’s motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Alvarez v. New York City Department of Education · No. 1:20-cv-00255
Judge
Vernon Broderick
Date
Apr. 15, 2021

Background

Evelyn Alvarez brought claims under federal, New York State, and New York City laws prohibiting age, sex, and disability discrimination, as well as retaliation. She alleged that she had extensive teaching experience with the New York City Department of Education and had not received an unsatisfactory evaluation. In January 2019, the Department canceled her English-as-a-New-Language class and reassigned her to teach a K-1 class, while a younger male teacher with less seniority kept his English-as-a-New-Language class. Alvarez alleged that school officials then watched and followed her, entered her classroom in an intimidating manner, yelled at her, and otherwise harassed her.

Alvarez later had knee surgery and was away from work for about 26 days. After she returned, the Department extended her probation for one year, preventing her from obtaining tenure, and issued her an excess letter. She complained through her union that she was being harassed because of her surgery. She also alleged that the Department later denied her grievance.

The Department moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint contains enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. The court treated the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion, but did not make findings that those allegations were actually true.

Waiver and Notice of Claim

The Department argued that Alvarez had waived claims based on events before June 12, 2019, when she signed an agreement extending her probation. The agreement purported to waive claims against the Department and its agents for events occurring before that date, while preserving claims arising afterward. The court declined to decide on the pleadings whether Alvarez had knowingly and voluntarily signed the waiver. The court concluded that the factual record needed to be developed, including how long Alvarez had to review the agreement and what role, if any, she had in setting its terms.

The court separately concluded that the agreement did not waive Alvarez’s federal age-discrimination claims because it did not specifically refer to the federal age-discrimination statute and the record did not show that she had seven days to revoke the waiver.

New York Education Law requires a notice of claim before certain claims may be brought against a school district or board of education. The court held that Alvarez’s notice did not mention disability discrimination, so her New York State and New York City disability claims were barred. The court also held that her state and city age and sex claims based on events before June 14, 2019, were untimely because she did not file her notice of claim within three months of the alleged January 10, 2019 discrimination. The court rejected her arguments that the notice period was tolled, that her federal administrative charge substituted for a notice of claim, or that an exception for public rights applied.

Disability Discrimination

The court dismissed Alvarez’s federal disability-discrimination claims. Alvarez alleged that she had knee surgery and missed about 26 days of work, but the complaint did not allege that her condition substantially limited a major life activity after she returned to work. The court characterized the alleged impairment, at most, as temporary and too brief to be substantially limiting. The complaint also did not allege that the Department regarded her as impaired or that she had a record of an impairment.

Federal Age and Sex Discrimination

The court allowed Alvarez’s federal age and sex discrimination claims to proceed. It found that she was within the age group protected by the federal age-discrimination law and that she was protected under federal sex-discrimination law because she alleged discrimination as a woman. Her teaching experience, master’s degree, years teaching the relevant subject, and lack of unsatisfactory evaluations sufficiently alleged that she was qualified.

The court found that Alvarez plausibly alleged several adverse employment actions, meaning employment decisions that materially changed her working conditions. These included extending her probation and denying her tenure, issuing the excess letter, and canceling her English-as-a-New-Language class while assigning her to a K-1 class without using her English-as-a-New-Language license or master’s degree. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, Alvarez also alleged enough facts to support a minimal inference of discriminatory intent because a younger male teacher with less experience kept his English-as-a-New-Language class while she lost hers. The court stated that factual disputes about whether the two teachers were similarly situated should not be resolved at this stage.

The court allowed Alvarez’s New York State and New York City age and sex discrimination claims based on events after June 14, 2019, to proceed because the June 17, 2019 excess letter was an alleged adverse employment action after the relevant notice period. The court applied a broader standard to the New York City claims.

Retaliation

The court allowed Alvarez’s age- and sex-retaliation claims to proceed. She alleged that she complained to school officials and the Department through her union that the younger male teacher was being treated more favorably because of age and sex. The court found that the complaints, followed months later by the probation extension and denial of tenure, adequately alleged protected complaints, employer awareness, an adverse employment action, and a possible causal connection based on timing.

The court dismissed Alvarez’s federal, state, and city disability-retaliation claims. The alleged employment actions occurred before she complained that she was being discriminated against because of her knee surgery. The court also concluded that the later denial of her grievance did not establish a causal connection because similar adverse actions had begun before the disability-related complaint. The court reached the same result under the broader New York City retaliation standard.

Disposition

Judge Vernon S. Broderick ordered that the Department’s motion to dismiss be granted as to the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Twelfth Causes of Action; the Second, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action insofar as they concerned claims accruing before June 14, 2019; and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Causes of Action insofar as they concerned retaliation based on disability discrimination.

The motion was denied as to the First, Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Causes of Action; the Second, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action insofar as they concerned claims accruing after June 14, 2019; and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Causes of Action insofar as they concerned retaliation based on age and sex or gender discrimination. The clerk was directed to close the motion.

The authoritative version

Read the full 24-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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