Prado v. ICE Agent Perez

Background

Jesus Prado brought claims under Bivens, an implied damages remedy for certain constitutional violations by federal officers, and the Federal Tort Claims Act against ICE Agents Perez, Attanasio, Olivencia, and Calidonio and the United States. Prado alleged that the agents entered his home at 5:00 a.m. on October 27, 2015, without consent and with only an administrative immigration warrant; pushed him onto his bed; searched his apartment; handcuffed him; and took him into immigration custody.

Prado further alleged that his medication bag was taken and discarded during processing, that he went without medication for five days, and that his medication was then administered incorrectly for an extended period. He also alleged that his prostate-related condition worsened, that a urologist determined he needed surgery, and that the surgery was delayed for almost two months. He was detained from October 27, 2015, until April 19, 2016, when an immigration judge ordered his release on his own recognizance.

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

The Defendants argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) barred the court from hearing claims arising from the beginning of removal proceedings. The court rejected that argument. Relying on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute, the court concluded that the statute covers only the Attorney General’s decisions to commence proceedings, decide cases, or carry out removal orders—not separate claims concerning the manner of an arrest or detention. The court therefore concluded that it retained jurisdiction over Prado’s claims.

Federal Tort Claims Act Medical-Care Claims

The Defendants argued that the United States retained immunity from Prado’s medical-negligence claims because Bergen County Jail was an independent contractor responsible for detainees’ medical care. The court explained that the Federal Tort Claims Act waives the United States’ immunity only in specified circumstances and generally does not cover negligence by independent contractors.

The court nevertheless held that Prado was alleging direct negligence by the Government, rather than trying to hold the Government responsible for Bergen’s negligence. The complaint alleged that ICE failed to send required medical information and medication when Prado was transferred and that ICE delayed approval of needed outside medical care. Because the Government retained authority to approve outside treatment, the court found that the duty of care had not necessarily been delegated entirely to Bergen. The court therefore declined to dismiss these medical-negligence claims for lack of jurisdiction. It also rejected the Defendants’ argument that the claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Bivens Claim

The court held that Prado adequately stated a Bivens claim based on the alleged unconstitutional arrest and search. The court determined that the claim did not present a materially different context from the original Bivens case, which involved an allegedly unconstitutional arrest and search in New York City. The fact that the officers were ICE agents and possessed an administrative immigration warrant did not change that conclusion because, as alleged, the warrant did not authorize entry into or a search of Prado’s home.

The court further held that, even if the claim arose in a new Bivens context, the Defendants had not identified special reasons requiring the court to refuse a damages remedy. The court therefore allowed the Bivens claim to proceed.

Trespass Claim

The court rejected the Defendants’ argument that Prado’s trespass claim was barred because his administrative claim to the Government listed personal injuries but not property damage. Under New York law, trespass is an intentional invasion of another’s property, and damages may include personal injuries that directly result from the interference with possession. Because Prado alleged that his personal injuries flowed directly from the alleged unlawful intrusion into his home, and because those injuries had been reported to the Government, the trespass claim survived.

Abuse-of-Process Claim

The court dismissed the abuse-of-process claim. New York law requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant used legal process with an improper collateral objective beyond the legitimate purpose of the process. Prado argued that the Defendants’ collateral objective was to exceed the warrant’s scope and enter his home. The court held that this described an allegedly improper method of carrying out the arrest, not the separate improper purpose required for an abuse-of-process claim.

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The court allowed Prado’s negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim to proceed. It concluded that the complaint adequately alleged a duty specific to Prado because the ICE agents allegedly knew, or had reason to know, that he was particularly vulnerable because of his serious mental illness and his residence in supportive housing. The court also found that the alleged early-morning entry, physical force, armed presence, and search plausibly caused Prado to fear for his physical safety and provided the required basis for treating his emotional injury as genuine.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. It dismissed the abuse-of-process claim and allowed the remaining claims to continue. The Defendants were directed to answer the remaining claims by April 24, 2020.