Farquharson v. Lafayette

Background

Delia M. Farquharson brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Reginald A. Lafayette, Douglas A. Colety, Jeanine L. Palazola, Dorothy L. DiPalo, and the Westchester County Board of Election. She alleged that the defendants denied her the opportunity to run for Mayor of Mount Vernon, New York, violating her rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. She also asserted state-law claims for civil theft, conversion, and spoliation.

According to the complaint, Farquharson submitted petitions with 985 signatures on March 19, 2019, before New York’s April 1–4 filing period. The Board later determined that the petitions were untimely and would not place her name on the Democratic primary ballot. Farquharson requested reconsideration and a hearing, but no Board hearing was scheduled. She later filed an amended cover sheet on April 1, 2019, but objections to her petitions prevented her from appearing on the ballot. She alleged that Lafayette and the Board treated her unfairly, including because of her West Indian heritage, and that the defendants improperly retained her petitions.

Jurisdiction, Mootness, and Standing

The defendants argued that the passage of the June 25, 2019 mayoral primary made Farquharson’s claims moot and that she lacked standing. The court held that her requests for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot because she could no longer run in that election and had not shown a reasonable expectation that the same events would happen to her again. The court therefore granted dismissal of those requests without prejudice.

The court held, however, that Farquharson’s damages claims were not moot. It also rejected the standing challenge, concluding that she had plausibly alleged an injury—the loss of an opportunity to run for mayor—that was connected to the defendants’ conduct and could be remedied by damages. The court emphasized that this conclusion addressed standing, not whether the claims would ultimately succeed.

Federal Claims

The court granted dismissal of the due-process claim with prejudice. It questioned whether Farquharson had a protected property or liberty interest in her candidacy, but held that, regardless, New York Election Law Article 16 provided an adequate expedited court process to challenge the Board’s petition decision. Farquharson had not used that process to challenge the initial determination.

The court treated the alleged discrimination and disparate-impact claims as Equal Protection claims rather than First Amendment claims. It dismissed both claims without prejudice because Farquharson did not identify a similarly situated candidate who was treated differently and did not plead facts showing intentional discrimination based on her West Indian heritage or another protected characteristic. The court also stated that the First Amendment does not recognize a disparate-impact theory.

The court granted dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim. Farquharson alleged that the defendants seized and effectively destroyed her petitions. The court concluded that she knowingly submitted the petitions before the filing period, that New York law restricted removing petitions from the Board’s custody, and that her own allegations showed she was able to file an amended cover sheet. The court did not state a prejudice qualifier for this dismissal in that section.

State-Law Claims

The court held that civil theft duplicated conversion and that New York does not recognize spoliation of evidence as an independent tort. It therefore treated conversion as the only potentially cognizable state-law claim.

The court granted dismissal of the conversion claim against the Board and the individual defendants in their official capacities because Farquharson had not filed a required notice of claim. That dismissal was without prejudice upon a showing that she obtained permission from a New York state or county court to file a late notice of claim. The court also granted dismissal without prejudice of the conversion claim against the individual defendants because it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing the federal claims. The court expressly declined to decide the conversion claim’s merits.

Leave to Amend and Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and gave Farquharson leave to file an amended complaint as to claims not dismissed with prejudice. The deadline was May 29, 2020. The court stated that failure to amend would result in dismissal of the federal claims with prejudice and dismissal of the state-law claims without prejudice so they could be refiled in state court.