Dass v. The City University of New York

Background

Krishna Dass alleged that she worked for The City University of New York (CUNY) as an Athletic Director at Hostos Community College from April 17, 2013, until January 15, 2019, when she said she was constructively terminated. She alleged that CUNY and Hostos administrators ignored her requests to have her position reclassified from Higher Education Associate to Higher Education Officer, even though she was qualified and other CUNY Athletic Directors had that status and earned more.

Dass also alleged that administrators undermined her authority, excluded her from meetings, communicated directly with male subordinates, and subjected her and other female employees to insulting or intimidating conduct. She alleged that a custodian trapped her in a gymnasium closet and demanded a hug and kiss before releasing her, and that Hostos took no action after she complained. She further alleged that mold, rodents, dust, and unsanitary conditions worsened her allergic asthma; that Hostos denied her request to work from home; and that she faced adverse treatment after complaining about discrimination and taking medical leave.

Claims and analysis

Dass asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Equal Pay Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

The court held that Dass plausibly pleaded sex discrimination under Title VII against CUNY. Although the alleged conduct occurred at Hostos and involved its administrators, the court concluded that the allegations plausibly connected those actions to CUNY’s potential responsibility for the employment decisions.

The court also held that Dass plausibly pleaded sex-discrimination claims against Hostos and Nathaniel Cruz under § 1983, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. Section 1983 allows claims against people acting under state authority for violating federal rights. The court found that the allegations about Cruz’s failure to submit or consider the reclassification request, his treatment of Dass, and the alleged constructive termination supported a minimal inference of sex-based discrimination. The court did not find adequate allegations for race or national-origin discrimination or for claims against David Gomez, Joshua Rivera, Eugene Sohn, or Johanna Gomez.

The court dismissed the Title VII retaliation claim because Dass did not plausibly allege that her October 24, 2017 discrimination complaint was the necessary cause of the later adverse actions. Her allegations stated that many of the same actions began before that complaint and, in some instances, before 2017.

The court dismissed the Equal Pay Act claim because Dass did not provide enough facts showing that her work was substantially equal in skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions to that of the higher-paid male Athletic Directors. The court noted that the other Athletic Directors worked at different CUNY colleges, that Dass’s staff was smaller, and that she alleged her duties extended beyond the usual Athletic Director position.

The court dismissed the disability claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the related state and city laws. It found that Dass did not adequately connect the alleged adverse actions to her disability, did not sufficiently explain the circumstances of her request to work from home, and did not plead facts supporting discriminatory intent. The court also noted that her allegations indicated Hostos did not learn of her disability until after she made the work-from-home request.

The court dismissed both the Family and Medical Leave Act interference and retaliation claims. It rejected Dass’s argument that taking away vacation time interfered with her leave rights because an employer may require or allow accrued paid leave to be used during Family and Medical Leave Act leave. The court also found that the alleged adverse actions began before her leave or were alleged to have occurred throughout her employment, defeating a plausible inference that the leave caused them.

The court rejected the defendants’ argument that many claims were barred for failure to complete administrative procedures, stating that this issue was not clear from the complaint and was better treated as an affirmative defense. The court rejected that argument at this stage without prejudice.

Disposition

Judge Vernon S. Broderick granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court dismissed Dass’s Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth causes of action. Her First, Second, Seventh, and Eighth causes of action, insofar as they alleged sex discrimination against CUNY, Hostos, and Cruz, could proceed. CUNY, Hostos, and Cruz were directed to answer the amended complaint within thirty days after the order’s entry. The Clerk was directed to terminate David Gomez, Joshua Rivera, Eugene Sohn, Johanna Gomez, and Does 1–10 as defendants.