Bromfield v. Bronx Lebanon Special Care Center, Inc.

Background

Lenora Bromfield filed the case in 2016, alleging employment discrimination and retaliation. She alleged that Bronx Lebanon Special Care Center, Inc., and other defendants falsely accused her of workplace misconduct, treated her differently because she is female, African-American, and over 40, and forced her to resign after suspending her. She also alleged retaliation for reporting that a coworker slept during work hours, complaining about patient care and staffing, and requesting a transfer.

Bromfield had requested appointed volunteer counsel several times. Earlier requests were denied, including one denial that allowed her to renew the request after explaining why her case had sufficient merit. She received limited volunteer representation for settlement negotiations, but that settlement conference was unsuccessful. She otherwise litigated the case without a lawyer, including during discovery and related motion practice. After filing an amended complaint, she made this fourth request for counsel.

Legal standard

A person who cannot afford a lawyer generally has no automatic constitutional right to a lawyer in a civil case. The court may appoint volunteer counsel when the person’s position appears likely to have substance. The court considers the apparent merits, the person’s ability to pay, efforts to obtain counsel, availability of counsel, and ability to investigate facts and handle the case without assistance. The person need not prove that the claims would survive dismissal or summary judgment; a minimum showing of merit is enough.

Court’s analysis

The court found that Bromfield had provided a sufficient basis to conclude that she lacked the financial resources to hire counsel and had diligently sought a lawyer. It also found that her amended complaint, read liberally because she was representing herself, met the minimum merit threshold for at least some claims.

The court said Bromfield’s request itself did not adequately explain facts connecting her discharge to Title VII discrimination. It also said her retaliation allegations were not well supported because the activities she identified—reporting poor nursing performance, patient mistreatment, and requesting a transfer—were not protected activities under Title VII.

The court nevertheless found that Bromfield alleged that she belonged to protected classes, suffered an adverse employment action because of discriminatory intent, and experienced specific discriminatory treatment. It identified her allegations that she was suspended while comparable coworkers were not, and that discriminatory intent led to her forced resignation. The court concluded that these allegations met the minimum merit threshold for at least some discrimination claims; it did not decide whether those claims ultimately would succeed.

The court also considered Bromfield’s ability to proceed without counsel. It noted that she had managed the litigation for approximately four years but had difficulty developing her claims, understanding the court’s requirements, and handling filings and issues in the case. The court observed that the legal issues might not be unusually complex, but it was doubtful that Bromfield could meaningfully continue without a lawyer. It also noted that the COVID-19 crisis had made volunteer counsel more difficult to obtain.

Disposition

The court granted Bromfield’s application for volunteer counsel. It directed the Pro Se Office to request counsel for her and directed the Clerk of Court to close the docket entry for the application. The order addressed only the request for counsel; it did not resolve the underlying employment-discrimination or retaliation claims.