Diaz v. United States

Background

Francisco Diaz pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court sentenced him to 36 months in prison and three years of post-release supervision. Diaz originally pleaded not guilty but later changed his plea after consulting Jennifer Willis of the Federal Defenders of New York. At the May 1, 2019 plea hearing, the court found that his plea was knowing and voluntary.

After the Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States on June 21, 2019, the government had to prove not only that Diaz knowingly possessed a firearm, but also that he knew he had the relevant prohibited status—here, that he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison. At a later hearing, the court told Diaz that he could withdraw his plea or supplement his admissions. After discussing the issue with counsel, Diaz chose to supplement his admissions. He confirmed under oath that he understood the government’s burden and that he knew he had previously been convicted of a felony when he possessed the firearm. The court then found a sufficient factual basis for the plea. Diaz did not appeal his conviction.

Claims and legal standards

Diaz moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a procedure allowing a federal prisoner to seek correction of a sentence imposed unlawfully or in violation of constitutional rights. He argued that counsel was ineffective in advising him to supplement his plea and in failing to object to what he viewed as pleading guilty twice. He also sought appointment of Criminal Justice Act counsel and unspecified preliminary injunctive relief.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Diaz had to show both that his lawyer’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard and that the error likely affected the result. The court could deny the motion without an evidentiary hearing if the motion and existing record showed that Diaz was not entitled to relief. Although courts must read self-represented filings liberally, self-represented litigants must still comply with applicable legal rules.

Rehaif-related claims

The court rejected Diaz’s claim that counsel should not have advised him to plead guilty. Rehaif was decided after Diaz’s original plea. Once the decision issued, Diaz was informed of the new knowledge-of-status requirement, was told he could withdraw his plea, and expressly chose instead to supplement his admissions. His sworn statements established that he understood the government’s burden and knew he was a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm. The court concluded that counsel’s advice was objectively reasonable and that Diaz’s plea was knowing and voluntary.

The court also rejected any challenge based on the indictment’s failure to expressly allege knowledge of felony status. Relying on the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Balde, the court held that this omission was not a jurisdictional defect and did not deprive the court of authority over the criminal case. Unlike the defendant in Balde, Diaz had been advised that the government needed to prove the knowledge-of-status element beyond a reasonable doubt. The court therefore found no defect that invalidated the indictment or plea and no ineffective assistance of counsel.

Double-jeopardy claim

The court also rejected Diaz’s argument that the second plea violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, which generally bars a person from being prosecuted or punished twice for the same offense after the first proceeding has ended in a legally protected way. The court explained that Diaz had two plea colloquies, but the second supplemented the first. He entered one guilty plea and received one sentence. When offered the opportunity to withdraw the plea, he declined. The record therefore did not support his claim that the first plea was final and unconditional or that the second hearing was a second prosecution after the first had ended.

Disposition

The court denied Diaz’s Section 2255 motion in its entirety and without an evidentiary hearing. Judge Furman also denied as moot Diaz’s motions for counsel and unspecified injunctive relief. Because Diaz did not make the required substantial showing that a constitutional right had been denied, the court declined to issue a certificate of appealability. It also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied permission to appeal without paying filing fees. The court directed the clerk to terminate the listed filings, close the civil case, and mail Diaz a copy of the order.