Straw v. Dentons US LLP

Background

Andrew U.D. Straw, an attorney appearing without a lawyer, filed claims against Dentons US LLP; Kevin P. McGoff, an attorney identified as Dentons’s “of counsel”; Indiana University McKinney School of Law; and Thomson West, identified as the publisher of the North Eastern Reporter. Straw had received permission to proceed without paying the filing fee.

The claims arose from publications discussing Straw’s 2017 suspension from practicing law in Indiana. The publications included a blog post by McGoff, an Indiana Law Review survey, and the North Eastern Reporter’s publication of the Indiana Supreme Court’s disciplinary decision. Straw asserted a retaliation claim under Title V of the Americans with Disabilities Act and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. He also sought a declaration that his earlier lawsuits were not frivolous and that the Indiana Supreme Court’s suspension decision was wrong.

Legal standards

Because Straw was proceeding without paying the filing fee, the court was required to dismiss the complaint, or any part of it, if it was frivolous, failed to state a legally sufficient claim, sought money from an immune defendant, or was outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The court applied the requirement that a complaint contain enough factual detail to make a claim plausible, rather than merely possible. It also noted that an attorney representing himself ordinarily does not receive the special flexibility given to other people who represent themselves.

Americans with Disabilities Act retaliation

The court explained that an ADA retaliation claim requires protected activity, the defendant’s knowledge of that activity, an adverse action, and a causal connection between the activity and the adverse action. It held that the ADA does not provide for individual liability, so Straw’s ADA claim against McGoff had to be dismissed.

The court assumed, without deciding, that Thomson West and Indiana University McKinney could potentially be liable under the ADA even though Straw sued them as publishers rather than as employers or public entities covered by the statute. It nevertheless held that Straw did not allege facts establishing retaliation. Thomson West’s publication of an Indiana Supreme Court decision could not constitute a prohibited adverse action, and neither could the defendants’ publication of commentary about that decision. The court also found no indication that the authors or publishers acted out of hostility toward Straw. It therefore concluded that Straw failed to state an ADA retaliation claim against any defendant.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress

The court considered whether it should exercise authority over Straw’s state-law emotional-distress claim after dismissing the federal claims. It noted uncertainty about whether the parties’ citizenship might support diversity jurisdiction, which can allow a federal court to hear state-law claims involving citizens of different jurisdictions.

Applying New York law, the court stated that intentional infliction of emotional distress requires extreme and outrageous conduct, an intent to cause severe emotional distress, a causal connection, and severe emotional distress. The court held that publishing information about Straw’s disciplinary proceedings did not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. The disciplinary decision was already a public record and available through public legal databases. The court dismissed the emotional-distress allegations for failure to state a claim.

First Amendment

The court held that the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision and attorney-discipline proceedings involved matters of public concern. It concluded that the First Amendment protected the defendants from liability merely for publishing a summary of Straw’s disciplinary action and commentary about that decision. The court treated the First Amendment as a defense to the claims based on those publications.

Challenge to the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision

To the extent Straw sought review of the Indiana Supreme Court’s characterization of his lawsuits or his suspension, the court held that a federal district court lacks authority to act as an appeals court over a state-court judgment. It dismissed Straw’s request for a declaration that his earlier ADA lawsuit and other lawsuits were not frivolous because the court lacked jurisdiction to review or overturn the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision.

Disposition

The court dismissed Straw’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. It denied as moot Straw’s motion for U.S. Marshal service of the summons and complaint and denied all other requests as moot. The opinion was signed by Louis L. Stanton, United States District Judge.