Ortiz v. Annucci

Background

Alex Ortiz, proceeding without a lawyer, was participating in the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision Temporary Release Program. The program allowed him to work and spend overnight periods with his family. After Ortiz left the facility on furlough and failed to return as required, officials apprehended him and charged him with prison-rule violations for absconding and violating the temporary-release rules. Ortiz pleaded guilty with an explanation and received disciplinary penalties.

A Temporary Release Committee later reviewed his participation. Ortiz admitted violating the program rules and asked to call two witnesses whom he believed would support his continued participation. According to the amended complaint, Defendant Laurie Campbell told him that he could not call witnesses or present evidence at the hearing, although his witnesses could submit letters. The committee recommended removing Ortiz from the program, Defendant Leroy Fields removed him, and Defendant Melinda Vick later affirmed the decision on appeal.

The amended complaint asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, for procedural and substantive due process violations, failure to intervene, conspiracy, and supervisory liability. It also asserted claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The amended complaint named Priscilla Ledbetter, Melinda Vick, Leroy Fields, Laurie Campbell, Damon Glover, Ebony Blacke, and John and Jane Doe defendants. The original complaint had named Anthony Annucci, but the amended complaint removed him.

Procedural Due Process

The court recognized that incarcerated people participating in work release have a protected liberty interest in continuing in the program. That interest requires a hearing with protections similar to those used in parole-revocation proceedings, including notice, an opportunity to be heard, some opportunity to present witnesses or documents, a neutral decisionmaker, and an explanation of the decision.

The court dismissed Ortiz’s claims against all named defendants based on the alleged denial of witnesses, evidence, and a meaningful opportunity to argue against revocation. The court reasoned that Ortiz had not alleged that officials prevented him from submitting letters, that he asked to keep the record open, that he tried to submit letters, or that he offered letters on appeal. He also did not plausibly allege that the proposed witnesses would have supported his continued participation or that their information would have changed the decision.

The court also dismissed Ortiz’s claim that the Temporary Release Committee defendants were biased. Ortiz had admitted absconding, which was evidence supporting the decision, and he had been given an opportunity to submit letters. The court stated that Ortiz was entitled to present reasons why he should remain in the program, but not to a reviewer who agreed with him. It found that Campbell’s view that the violation disqualified Ortiz from further temporary release did not plausibly show bias or an arbitrary result.

The claim against Ledbetter, Fields, and Vick for failing to take corrective action was also dismissed. The court stated that because the Temporary Release Committee had not violated Ortiz’s due-process rights, approving or affirming its recommendation did not itself violate those rights based on the allegations pleaded.

Substantive Due Process

The court dismissed Ortiz’s substantive-due-process claim. Substantive due process generally protects against government action that is arbitrary, irrational, or shocking in a constitutional sense. The court found that the decision was supported by Ortiz’s admission that he violated the program rules and was related to the legitimate interest of preventing a person who had absconded from repeating that conduct while on temporary release.

Conspiracy, Supervisory Liability, and Failure to Intervene

The court dismissed the § 1983 conspiracy claim because Ortiz alleged only that the defendants agreed to act together and pleaded no facts showing a meeting of the minds to violate his rights. The court also noted that there was no underlying constitutional violation and that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine generally barred a conspiracy claim involving employees of the same entity acting within their employment.

The supervisory-liability claim was dismissed because supervisory liability is not an independent claim and Ortiz had not plausibly alleged an underlying constitutional violation, personal involvement, or specific facts showing that the supervisors failed to train or supervise the other defendants. The court likewise dismissed the failure-to-intervene claim because such a claim cannot succeed without an underlying constitutional violation.

Emotional-Distress Claims and Official-Capacity Claims

The court explained that federal law does not create a constitutional right to be free from emotional distress. It treated Ortiz’s intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims as state-law claims despite his position that they were based on federal law. Because all federal claims were being dismissed before trial, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning jurisdiction over related state-law claims. The emotional-distress claims were dismissed with prejudice to the extent they were brought under federal law and without prejudice to the extent they were brought under state law.

The court also dismissed Ortiz’s claims against the defendants in their official capacities under the Eleventh Amendment, which generally limits federal lawsuits against states and state officials in their official capacities.

Qualified Immunity

The court alternatively held that the individual defendants would be protected by qualified immunity even if Ortiz had shown a due-process violation. Qualified immunity protects government officials from personal liability unless their conduct violated a clearly established federal right. The court found no clearly established right to live testimony from character witnesses in a temporary-release hearing and found it objectively reasonable for officials to rely on Ortiz’s admission and the evidence supporting the revocation.

Leave to Amend and Disposition

Ortiz asked to amend his complaint again. The court declined because he had already amended once after receiving notice of the alleged deficiencies and did not identify facts that another amendment would add to cure them.

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, directed the clerk to enter judgment for the defendants and close the case, and terminated the pending motion. Judge Cathy Seibel signed the opinion and order on May 22, 2020.