Scott v. Rosenberger
- Cathy Seibel
- 7:19-cv-01769
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 27
In Scott v. Rosenberger, Judge Seibel granted in part and denied in part dismissal, ending some claims while allowing others about parole conditions to proceed.
Eugene Scott’s claims against parole officers Robert Rosenberger and Gary Morgiewicz; some claims were dismissed, while challenges to several parole conditions remained pending.
What happened
In Scott v. Rosenberger, Eugene Scott, representing himself, sued parole officers Robert Rosenberger and Gary Morgiewicz under a federal civil-rights law. He challenged his designation as a discretionary sex offender and several parole conditions, including limits on cameras, vehicles, computers, internet use, education, employment, and relationships.
The court dismissed Scott’s request for a declaration because he was no longer on parole, dismissed claims against the officers in their official capacities, and dismissed his challenges to the sex-offender designation and the condition barring contact with minors without permission. Claims challenging the other listed conditions were allowed to continue.
Judge Seibel also rejected the officers’ request for protection from personal liability at this stage because the factual record was not developed enough to decide that issue. The motion to dismiss was therefore granted in part and denied in part.
The detailed version
- Scott v. Rosenberger · No. 7:19-cv-01769
- Cathy Seibel
- July 24, 2020
Background
Eugene Scott sued New York parole officers Robert Rosenberger and Gary Morgiewicz under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of procedural and substantive due process and the First Amendment. Scott challenged his designation as a discretionary sex offender and several parole conditions imposed after his release from prison. The conditions included restrictions on contact with minors, cameras, vehicles, computers, and internet use; a requirement to obtain permission before pursuing certain activities; denial of permission to take emergency medical technician classes; disclosure of his youthful-offender status to colleges; and notice to Rosenberger of any relationships.
Scott sought declaratory relief and money damages. Before the motion was decided, Scott acknowledged that he was no longer on parole or subject to the challenged conditions. He did not amend his complaint by the court’s deadline and did not oppose the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court nevertheless evaluated whether the complaint stated plausible claims, giving special consideration to Scott’s self-represented status but not supplying facts that he had not alleged.
Rulings on Relief and Capacity
The court dismissed Scott’s claims seeking declaratory relief as moot because he had reached the maximum expiration date of his sentence and was no longer subject to parole conditions. It also dismissed his claims against Rosenberger and Morgiewicz in their official capacities because the court held that state officials were protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity from § 1983 damages claims in that capacity.
Discretionary Sex-Offender Designation
The court dismissed Scott’s procedural and substantive due-process claims challenging his designation as a discretionary sex offender. For procedural due process, the court explained that Scott first had to identify a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. Scott’s complaint stated that he had pleaded guilty to a criminal sexual act involving his six-year-old cousin. Because he did not dispute committing a sexual offense, the court held that he had not plausibly alleged that the sex-offender designation was false. He therefore could not establish a protected reputation interest under the “stigma-plus” theory, which requires a false reputation-damaging statement combined with a material government-imposed burden.
The court reached the same result on substantive due process. It held that Scott had not plausibly alleged a protected liberty interest in avoiding the designation because he had pleaded that he committed a sexual offense.
Special Parole Conditions
The court dismissed Scott’s challenge to the condition prohibiting contact with minors without permission. Given his admitted criminal sexual act involving a six-year-old, the court held that this restriction was reasonably related to his past conduct and designed to prevent further offenses. The court noted that Scott had not alleged that this restriction interfered with a relationship with his son.
The court allowed Scott to proceed on challenges to the following conditions:
- Camera restrictions: Scott plausibly alleged that his offense and probation violation did not involve cameras, videos, cellphones, or related equipment, making the restriction potentially unrelated to his past conduct. - Vehicle restrictions: Scott plausibly alleged that his crimes did not involve vehicles and that he was not a flight risk. The court also found that requiring permission even to be a passenger could not be justified at this stage merely because exceptions were available. - Computer and internet restrictions: Scott plausibly alleged that his underlying crime and probation violation did not involve computers or the internet. The court held that he also plausibly alleged First Amendment concerns because the restrictions broadly limited computer and internet access. - Emergency medical technician classes: Scott plausibly alleged that taking certification classes would not put him in contact with young minors and that blocking the training could unnecessarily prevent him from pursuing his desired occupation. The court found the alleged restriction potentially arbitrary and capricious and allowed the related First Amendment and due-process claims to proceed. - Disclosure to colleges: The court held that Scott plausibly alleged that requiring disclosure of his youthful-offender status before attending college was not reasonably related to his offense. The defendants’ assertion that some college students might be minors was insufficient at the motion-to-dismiss stage. - Disclosure of relationships: The court held that Scott plausibly alleged that requiring notice of all relationships, “sexual or not,” was unconstitutionally vague because people of ordinary intelligence could not know what conduct the condition covered. He also plausibly alleged that the condition was too broad and not reasonably related to his criminal conduct.
Qualified Immunity
The defendants argued that qualified immunity protected them from personal liability. Qualified immunity can protect government officials unless their conduct violated a clearly established federal right or was objectively reasonable under clearly established law. The court rejected dismissal on that basis at this stage. It held that Scott had plausibly alleged that eight special conditions were unrelated to his past conduct and that further factual development was needed to determine whether the challenged rights were clearly established or whether reasonable parole officers could have believed the conditions were lawful.
Disposition
The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Scott’s complaint was dismissed to the extent it sought declaratory relief, asserted claims against the defendants in their official capacities, challenged the discretionary sex-offender designation, or challenged the no-contact-with-minors condition. The motion was denied in all other respects, allowing the claims concerning camera, vehicle, computer and internet, emergency medical technician, college-disclosure, and relationship-disclosure conditions to proceed. The court directed the parties to attend a scheduling conference and warned that the case could later be dismissed for failure to prosecute if Scott did not attend.
Read the full 27-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.