Freedman v. City of New York

Background

Karen Lee Freedman alleged that four New York City Sheriff’s Deputies violated her due-process right under the Fourteenth Amendment when they served her with a temporary order of protection and forced her to leave an apartment she leased. The opinion states that the Deputies told Freedman she had to leave immediately, despite her statement that she was the leaseholder and her husband’s statement that the order did not require her to leave.

Freedman brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that allows damages claims for violations of constitutional rights by state or local officials. She sought damages from the City of New York, Joseph Fucito, identified as the Sheriff of the City of New York, and the four Deputies.

The City and Fucito moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The court applied the same general pleading standard used for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. At this stage, the court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences in Freedman’s favor, but required enough factual content to make the claims plausible.

Claims Against the City

The court held that Freedman had not adequately alleged municipal liability against the City. A city cannot be held responsible under Section 1983 merely because it employs someone who allegedly violated a person’s rights. The plaintiff must allege that a city policy, custom, decision by a final policymaker, or deliberately inadequate training or supervision caused the constitutional violation.

Freedman alleged that the City had a customary procedure for serving and enforcing temporary protection orders that led to erroneous property deprivations. The court found these allegations conclusory because the complaint provided no additional facts supporting the existence of such a policy or custom. The court also found that the failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise allegations were general statements without factual support. It therefore dismissed Freedman’s Section 1983 claim against the City.

Claims Against Fucito

The court also held that Freedman had not adequately alleged Fucito’s personal involvement. Individual liability under Section 1983 requires allegations that the official participated in, caused, or otherwise had a legally sufficient role in the alleged constitutional violation; an official cannot be held liable simply because of a supervisory position.

Freedman alleged that Fucito was a final policymaker, failed to train and supervise Deputies, and knew or should have known about the alleged policy but failed to correct it. The court found that these allegations merely repeated legal theories for establishing personal involvement and were not supported by additional facts. It therefore dismissed the Section 1983 claim against Fucito.

Disposition

Judge Alison J. Nathan granted the City and Fucito’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court dismissed Freedman’s claims against the City and Fucito without prejudice and gave her leave to file a second amended complaint within 21 days.

The order did not dismiss the claims against the four Sheriff’s Deputies. It required Freedman to file proof that she served the amended complaint on them within 14 days. If she failed to do so, and failed to show good cause if required, the court stated that the remaining claims against the Deputies would be dismissed without prejudice under Rule 4(m).