Craven v. City Of New York

Background

Cheryl Craven sued her former employer, the City of New York, and former supervisors Amy Weiswasser and Laura Parker. She alleged race and sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. She also asserted race-discrimination and retaliation claims under Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, brought through Section 1983, and claims under the Equal Pay Act.

Craven alleged that Weiswasser made discriminatory comments, subjected her to criticism and harassment, increased her workload without increasing her pay, and denied requests for additional staff or compensation. She also alleged that Phillip Schaffroth, a white male colleague, earned more than she did even though their responsibilities were similar and Craven alleged that her experience and workload were greater. Craven said she left her job because her health had deteriorated and she could no longer tolerate the workplace conditions. She also alleged that after she participated in an internal discrimination investigation, Weiswasser continued adding responsibilities and denying compensation.

The defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(6), which asks whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim, to dismiss all claims. At this stage, the court treated the complaint’s factual allegations as true and asked whether they plausibly supported relief.

Title VII, State, and City Discrimination Claims

The court held that Craven plausibly alleged race and sex discrimination based on unequal pay and excessive workload. Her allegations that she was paid less than a similarly situated white male colleague, despite having similar or greater responsibilities and experience, supported an inference of discrimination. Her allegations that she received an excessive and increasingly disruptive workload also stated a plausible adverse employment action.

The court dismissed these discrimination claims to the extent they relied on constructive discharge. Constructive discharge requires allegations that the employer deliberately created conditions intended to force the employee to resign. The court found that Craven alleged difficult conditions but did not plausibly allege that the defendants intended to compel her resignation.

The court also held that Craven plausibly alleged retaliation under Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. Her allegations that she received unequal pay and an excessive workload after participating in an internal discrimination interview, combined with allegations of continuing antagonism, were sufficient at the pleading stage.

Section 1981 Claims

The court allowed Craven’s Section 1981 race-discrimination claim based on unequal pay to proceed against Weiswasser. The court reasoned that her allegations that she was at least as experienced as Schaffroth, that he was white, and that he was paid more were sufficient at this stage to support the required conclusion that the pay loss would not have occurred but for race.

The court dismissed Craven’s Section 1981 race-discrimination claim based on excessive workload. The complaint did not identify people to whom Weiswasser would have assigned the work instead of Craven or otherwise provide sufficient facts linking the workload assignment to Craven’s race.

The court allowed Craven’s Section 1981 retaliation claims based on unequal pay and excessive workload to proceed against Weiswasser. It dismissed the Section 1981 claims against Parker in her individual capacity because the complaint did not adequately allege that Parker was personally involved in the specific unequal-pay and retaliation violations at issue.

Equal Pay Act Claims

The court allowed Craven’s Equal Pay Act unequal-pay claim to proceed. It found sufficient her allegations that she was paid less than Schaffroth, a male employee, even though they performed work requiring similar or greater responsibility, skill, and effort.

The court dismissed Craven’s Equal Pay Act retaliation claim. Although she allegedly requested a merit increase and complained that her duties were more demanding than those of other directors, the complaint did not plausibly allege that she gave the defendants fair notice that she was complaining about conduct violating the Equal Pay Act. The court noted that the directors she identified included both men and women and that she did not mention Schaffroth, the comparator identified in her complaint.

Disposition

Judge Jesse M. Furman’s order granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The motion was granted as to Craven’s discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law based on constructive discharge; her Section 1981 discrimination claim based on excessive workload and constructive discharge; her Section 1981 discrimination and retaliation claims against Parker; and her Equal Pay Act retaliation claim.

The motion was denied as to her discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law based on unequal pay and excessive workload; her Section 1981 discrimination claim based on unequal pay against Weiswasser; her Section 1981 retaliation claims based on unequal pay and excessive workload against Weiswasser; and her Equal Pay Act unequal-pay claim.

The court declined to grant Craven permission to amend the dismissed claims because she had not requested amendment or suggested additional facts that would cure the pleading defects. The defendants were directed to answer the remaining claims within three weeks of the order, and the initial pretrial conference was reinstated and adjourned to July 1, 2020.