Brennan v. City of Middletown

Background

Jennifer Brennan sued the City of Middletown and Middletown Police Sergeant Patrick Cunningham. She alleged that Cunningham violated her federal constitutional right to be free from excessive force, that Cunningham committed battery under New York law, and that the City was responsible under New York law for Cunningham’s alleged battery. Brennan abandoned a separate claim against the City based on municipal policy or practice.

A jury trial took place on November 12 and 13, 2019. The jury returned a verdict for Brennan and awarded her $15,000. Judgment was entered on November 20, 2019.

The evidence included competing accounts of the May 14, 2017 encounter at A Friend’s House. Brennan testified that Cunningham forcibly pushed her face-first to the floor, placed a knee on her back, and tased her even though she had not threatened or struck anyone. Cunningham testified that Brennan was in a highly agitated state, refused to leave, resisted arrest, kept her hands in her pockets, and would not give officers her hands for handcuffing. He said he decided she needed to be taken to a hospital because he believed she was a danger to children and staff members.

The court also noted that the police department’s policy stated that tasers were designed to restrain violent individuals and were not substitutes for other nonlethal force options. Cunningham testified that he had training in pressure points and physical holds, but the officers did not use those methods before tasing Brennan.

Defendants’ post-trial motions

The defendants moved under Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for judgment as a matter of law. That procedure allows a court to overturn a jury verdict when the evidence could not reasonably support it. They alternatively moved under Rule 59(a) for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. They also argued that Cunningham was protected by qualified immunity, a legal protection for government officials when their conduct did not violate a clearly established right or when a reasonable official could have believed the conduct was lawful.

The court denied the defendants’ motion. It first observed that the defendants had not made the required earlier motion under Rule 50(a). Because of that failure, the Rule 50(b) motion could succeed only if allowing the verdict to stand would create a manifest injustice. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Brennan, the court identified evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Brennan was not a danger, had not been violent or threatened violence, and was tased only seconds after being grabbed and taken to the floor. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s excessive-force verdict and that the verdict was not seriously erroneous or a miscarriage of justice. It therefore denied judgment as a matter of law and denied a new trial on excessive force.

The court also concluded that Cunningham was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity. The defendants had not raised qualified immunity in a Rule 50(a) motion and had declined the opportunity to submit factual questions about that defense to the jury. Even considering Brennan’s version of the trial evidence, the court held that it was clearly established that an officer could not use significant force against an arrestee who was no longer resisting and posed no threat to officers or others. Based on Brennan’s testimony, the court determined that she was not actively resisting when Cunningham tased her. The court also denied the defendants’ alternative request for a new trial on qualified immunity, explaining that the defendants characterized the relevant facts as undisputed and that the issue was therefore a legal question.

Attorneys’ fees and costs

Brennan moved for attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which permits a prevailing civil-rights plaintiff to receive a reasonable fee. She requested $72,645 in fees and $1,304.55 in costs, for a total of $73,949.55.

The court found the request reasonable in general but reduced the compensation requested for attorney Stephen Bergstein. Although Bergstein was an experienced civil-rights lawyer, the court found that attorney Christopher Watkins primarily litigated the case and that Bergstein provided limited second-chair trial support. The court reduced Bergstein’s hourly rate from $450 to $250 and reduced his travel rate from $225 to $125.

The court awarded $67,885 in attorneys’ fees and $1,304.55 in costs, for a total award of $69,189.55. In its conclusion, the court denied the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, a new trial, and granted Brennan’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs in part, awarding $69,189.55.