Colacino v. Davis

Background

James Colacino and Colacino Industries, Inc. sued Mike Davis under state law for extortion, slander, and tortious interference with business relationships. The complaint alleged that Davis, the business manager of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 840, pressured Colacino to sign an agreement making Colacino Industries a union contractor; harassed and intimidated Colacino; interfered with plaintiffs’ dealings with vendors, contractors, and employees; and called Colacino a “crook” and “thief.”

The plaintiffs filed the case in Supreme Court, Westchester County. Davis removed it to federal court, asserting that the claims arose under federal law. The plaintiffs then moved to remand, meaning they asked the federal court to return the case to state court.

Section 301 preemption

The court held that the extortion and tortious-interference claims were completely preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Complete preemption means that federal law replaces a state-law claim when resolving the claim substantially depends on interpreting a collective bargaining agreement or another contract between an employer and a labor organization.

The court concluded that the extortion claim depended on examining the letter of assent, the collective bargaining agreement, and Davis’s conduct in seeking to enforce those agreements. The court likewise concluded that the business-interference claim required interpreting those agreements to determine whether plaintiffs had legitimate business relationships and whether Davis’s conduct was unjustified. The court noted that Section 301 preemption can apply when a claim is brought against a union’s agent rather than the union itself.

The court also noted that extortion under New York law appears to be a criminal offense that does not create a private right of action. This observation was included in a footnote; the court’s jurisdictional ruling rested on Section 301 preemption.

Section 303 preemption

The court separately held that the business-interference claim was preempted by Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Section 303 provides a private claim for certain unlawful labor-organizational conduct covered by the National Labor Relations Act, including threats, coercion, or restraint intended to force a person to stop doing business with another person.

The court determined that plaintiffs’ allegations that Davis contacted their vendors, contractors, and employees to intimidate them from doing business with plaintiffs described secondary-boycott activity. The court therefore concluded that the state-law business-interference claim was preempted by Section 303 as well.

Slander claim and disposition

Davis did not argue that the slander claim was preempted or independently arose under federal law. The court nevertheless exercised supplemental jurisdiction over that claim. Supplemental jurisdiction allows a federal court to hear related state-law claims that arise from the same core events as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction. The court found that the slander claim shared a common set of underlying facts with the other claims.

Judge Vincent L. Briccetti denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand. The Clerk was instructed to terminate the motion. The opinion did not enter judgment on the underlying claims or determine whether the alleged conduct occurred.