Branch v. State University of New York Downstate Medical Center

Background

Romain R. Branch sued the State University of New York and Ayman Fanous, individually and as Chair of the Department of Psychiatry at SUNY Downstate Medical Center. He alleged employment discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment based on race and national origin under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Sections 1981 and 1983, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law.

Branch alleged that he was hired in December 2015 as a Clinical Assistant Professor of Psychiatry and Director of the Adult Psychiatry Residency Training Program. He alleged that Fanous became department chair in August 2016 and later stopped attending or rescheduling weekly meetings with Branch, failed to respond to follow-up emails, and excluded him from meetings. Branch also alleged that he had to perform additional clinical, administrative, and ministerial work; unlike his predecessors and successors, he was not given an Assistant Program Director.

Branch alleged that Fanous recommended not renewing his contract, removed him as Program Director, and demoted him to Attending Psychiatrist. SUNY adopted the nonrenewal recommendation and terminated his employment when his contract expired. Branch said these actions were motivated by his race and national origin and were retaliation for his complaints about Fanous and the Psychiatry Department.

Legal standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to support a legally plausible claim. At this stage, the court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences for Branch. The court also considered two written complaints that Branch specifically referenced in the complaint.

Disparate treatment claims

The court applied the burden-shifting framework used for employment discrimination claims under Title VII, Sections 1981 and 1983, and the New York State Human Rights Law. At the pleading stage, Branch needed to allege facts plausibly showing that he was in a protected class, was qualified, suffered an adverse employment action, and was treated under circumstances suggesting discrimination.

The court found that Branch plausibly alleged at least two adverse employment actions: the termination of his employment and the denial of an Assistant Program Director, which required him to perform additional responsibilities. The court also accepted, for purposes of the motion, Branch’s allegation that he was demoted, although the parties presented conflicting accounts about whether he was demoted or declined to remain in the position.

The court found a plausible inference of discrimination based on Branch’s allegations that he was an African-American man of Caribbean national origin, had performed his duties in an exemplary manner, was removed as Program Director, and was replaced by people who were not African-American. Branch also alleged that his white predecessors and successors received Assistant Program Directors while he did not. The court held that the written complaints did not eliminate the possibility that race was one motivating factor, even though they offered other possible explanations for the defendants’ actions.

The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss Branch’s disparate treatment claims under Title VII, Section 1981, Section 1983, and the New York State Human Rights Law.

Retaliation

The court granted the motion to dismiss the retaliation claim. To state a Title VII retaliation claim, Branch had to allege that he opposed conduct that he reasonably believed was unlawful discrimination or participated in a related investigation or proceeding.

The court reviewed Branch’s written complaints and found that they described grievances about being ignored, changes to the residency program, alleged violations of professional standards, his job duties, due process, and other treatment. Although one complaint used the word “discriminatory,” the court found that the complaints did not say he was opposing a practice made unlawful by Title VII. The court held that the complaints therefore were not protected activity.

Hostile work environment

The court granted the motion to dismiss the hostile work environment claim. Such a claim requires conduct that is objectively severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile or abusive workplace, that the plaintiff subjectively viewed as hostile or abusive, and that occurred because of race or national origin.

The court held that Branch’s allegations—including exclusion from meetings, Fanous’s refusal to answer work-related questions or attend meetings, and the assignment of duties not imposed on predecessors or successors—did not show conduct that was sufficiently severe or pervasive.

New York City Human Rights Law claims

The court granted the motion to dismiss the New York City Human Rights Law claim against Fanous in his official capacity. It held that sovereign immunity barred that claim because Fanous’s official-capacity actions were treated as actions of the State.

The court denied the motion to dismiss the New York City Human Rights Law claim against Fanous in his individual capacity. It explained that the New York City law must be interpreted independently and broadly, and that Branch’s adequately pleaded federal disparate treatment claim was sufficient for the city-law claim to proceed. The conclusion also states that the motion was denied as to the New York City Human Rights Law claim against SUNY.

Disposition

Judge Torres granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The motion was granted with respect to Branch’s retaliation claim, hostile work environment claim, and New York City Human Rights Law claim against Fanous in his official capacity. It was denied with respect to Branch’s disparate treatment claims under Title VII, Sections 1981 and 1983, and the New York State Human Rights Law, and his New York City Human Rights Law claim against SUNY and Fanous in his individual capacity. The court also ordered the parties to appear for a case management conference and submit a joint status report.