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S.D.N.Y.Procedural orderFiled July 20, 2020

Cain v. Mercy College

Judge
Louis Stanton
Docket
1:20-cv-02262
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
26
Civil ProcedurePro SeMotion to DismissADA / Disability
In one sentence

In Cain v. Mercy College, Judge Stanton dismissed two claims, allowed amendment of others, and denied counsel without prejudice.

Who this affects

Ileen Cain’s claims against Mercy College were screened. Her Title II Americans with Disabilities Act and Fourteenth Amendment claims were dismissed; she could amend her other identified federal and admissions claims within 60 days. Her request for appointed counsel was denied without prejudice.

What happened

In Cain v. Mercy College, Ileen Cain, representing herself, alleged that Mercy College discriminated against her because of her race, sex, and disability. She brought claims under federal disability, education, and civil-rights laws, as well as New York law.

The court found that the complaint lacked enough facts connecting Mercy College’s conduct to race, sex, or disability discrimination. It also found that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act did not apply to the private college and that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply because Mercy College was not a state actor.

Judge Stanton dismissed the Title II and Fourteenth Amendment claims, granted Cain 60 days to amend her other federal claims and admissions claim, and denied her request for a lawyer without prejudice to renewal later.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Cain v. Mercy College · No. 1:20-cv-02262
Judge
Louis Stanton
Date
July 20, 2020

Background

Ileen Cain, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Mercy College. She alleged that she was an African-American woman with post-traumatic stress disorder and that the college discriminated against her because of her race, sex, and disability. Her allegations concerned alleged harassment by students and a staff member, the college’s responses to her stalking and cyberstalking complaints, a grade in an Introduction to Communication class, denial of an opportunity to retake an exam and participate in an activity, denial of admission to a graduate psychology program, and the college’s treatment of students associated with the College of New Rochelle.

Cain asserted claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title IX, the Fourteenth Amendment, New York City and New York civil-rights law, and other state-law theories identified in her complaint. The court had previously allowed her to proceed without paying filing fees, so it screened the complaint under the statute governing such cases.

Court’s Analysis

Title VI. The court treated the complaint as asserting both race-discrimination and hostile-educational-environment claims under Title VI. It held that Cain did not allege facts suggesting that Mercy College referred to her race, treated her differently from students of other races, or acted because race was a substantial or motivating factor. It also held that she did not allege facts showing race-based harassment that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to deprive her of educational opportunities. The court granted leave to amend both Title VI theories.

Rehabilitation Act. The court assumed, for purposes of its analysis, that Cain’s post-traumatic stress disorder could qualify as a disability and that Mercy College received federal funds. It held that she had not alleged facts identifying the benefit or activity from which she was excluded or showing that she was excluded solely because of her disability. The court also held that she had not alleged enough facts showing that the college was permeated with disability-based intimidation or establishing a basis for attributing the alleged conduct to the college. The court granted leave to amend these claims.

Americans with Disabilities Act. The court dismissed Cain’s Title II claims for failure to state a claim because Title II applies to public entities, and the court described Mercy College as a private educational institution. For Title III, the court explained that a private university may be a place of public accommodation, but held that Cain had not connected her disability to the professor’s refusal to let her retake an exam or participate in activities, the Associate Provost’s handling of her stalking allegations, or the administration’s response. The court granted leave to amend the Title III claims.

Title IX. The court held that Cain had not alleged facts showing that male students in similar circumstances were treated more favorably or that Mercy College’s conduct was based on sex. It also held that her allegations about calls to other students did not show a hostile educational environment severe enough to alter her education. The court granted leave to amend both the Title IX discrimination and hostile-environment claims.

Fourteenth Amendment. The court dismissed Cain’s due-process claim. It held that the Fourteenth Amendment generally applies to state action, not private entities, and that Mercy College’s provision of education did not make it a state actor.

Admissions and state-law claims. The court held that Cain’s allegations about discussions with Dr. Trenz, the waiver of recommendation letters, the expectation that her graduate-school application would be accepted, the application denial, and the College of New Rochelle did not suggest discrimination or identify a cause of action. It granted leave to amend the admissions claim. The opinion discussed supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims but did not state a separate final disposition of those claims in the conclusion.

Request for appointed counsel. The court denied Cain’s request for a lawyer without prejudice to renewal later because the case was too early for the court to assess its merits.

Disposition

The court granted Cain leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days asserting facts supporting her Title VI, Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, Title IX, and admissions claims. The amended complaint had to replace, rather than supplement, the original complaint and provide facts identifying who did what, when and where events occurred, how her rights were violated, her injuries, and the relief sought. The court warned that failure to amend on time, absent good cause, would result in dismissal for failure to state a claim. The court dismissed the Title II and Fourteenth Amendment claims and denied the application for appointed counsel without prejudice.

The authoritative version

Read the full 26-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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